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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to develop and analyze a computer-
based influenza epidemic model that could be used in evaluating the
effects of alternative immunization strategies. The objectives of this
thesis are to present a general mathematical model, to analyze the
sensitivity of the model 's parameters through computer simulation and to
indicate how the model might be applied to an anticipated influenza
epidemic. It is hoped that this thesis will present a structure that
will be useful to individuals interested in the control of influenza
epidemics.
The mathematical model that is used is the Kermack-McKendrik
deterministic disease model. This model is adapted to influenza based
on epidemiological characteristics of this disease. The computer programs
that perform the analysis are written in APL. The model is applied to
the 1957 epidemic of Asian influenza, One of the major limitations of
the model is the assumption of uniform exposure opportunities.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an attempt to develop and analyze a computer-
based influenza epidemic model that could be used in evaluating the
effects of alternative immunization strategies. The objectives of
this thesis are to present a general mathematical model, to analyze
the sensitivity of the model's parameters through computer simulation
and to indicate how the model might be applied to an anticipated
influenza epidemic. It is hoped that this thesis will present a
structure that will be useful to individuals interested in the control
of influenza epidemics.
Mathematical disease models were first developed in the 1920's,
prior to the discovery and isolation of the influenza virus in 1933. The
literature abounds with treatises on these and subsequent mathematical
disease models.
This thesis extends work done in these models in two ways.
First, there is little written regarding the calibration of the parameters
present in these models. This calibration is necessary to apply the models
to real world situations. This thesis cannot present a set of parameter
values that will apply to all influenza epidemics, Influenza epidemics
vary in intensity and other characteristics due to the strain of the
virus, the susceptibility of the population and the timing of the epidemic
in terms of season. Therefore the model that is presented must be
specified by the decision maker based on information available at the
time an epidemic threatens. There is an attempt in this thesis however
to discuss proper ranges for the parameters, as well as how the actual
values might be determined given the appropriate information.
The second way that this thesis extends work that has previously
been done is in applying the model to influenza rather than to another
disease. The few applications of disease models that exist in the
literature are primarily concerned with measles, This is probably due
to the relatively good understanding we have of measles, Most states
and countries require that all cases of measles be reported to local
health authorities. Immunity to measles is straightforward in that
once an individual is infected he experiences lifetime immunity.
In contrast, influenza suffers from a lack of consistent
and reliable information. This is partly due to the imprecision of
the clinical diagnosis of influenza, In fact the best indicator of
the presence of the influenza virus is the characteristic epidemic
proportions that accompany it. In addition, notification of influenza
cases is not usually mandatory by either doctors or individuals.
There is little consensus about how influenza epidemics arise or the
nature and duration of the immunity that is acquired after infection.
These aspects of the influenza problem as well as others
including the variability of the influenza virus and the periodic
antigenic shifts that viruses undergo make influenza very difficult
to model.
One of the major advantages that this thesis offers to those
interested in evaluating immunization control strategies is the
recognition within the model of the concept of "herd immunity," This
refers to the protection that the entire community gains from the
vaccination of one of its members. The vaccination of the one member
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protects not only that one individual but also the other individuals
with whom he might associate.
This thesis will first present the epidemiological factors
that must be considered in modeling the spread of a disease, This will
include a discussion of general concepts as well as the special
characteristics of influenza.
This background will allow us to present a general epidemic
model which is built upon many of the epidemiological concepts. This
presentation will include the assumptions of the model as well as a
discussion of the model's parameters. This model will first be analyzed
mathematically.
Computer simulation of the epidemic model will allow us to
determine the sensitivity of the model to various parameters,
We can then apply the model to a particular epidemic. This
will include an intital specification of a "base case" (no vaccination
program in effect) epidemic, which we will define as the 1957 Asian
influenza epidemic. After the parameters are specified for this base
case we then indicate how alternative strategies may be analyzed.
Finally, we look at particular problems in application and
limitations of the model,
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF INFLUENZA
In The Mathematical Theory of Epidemics, Bailey states
In many fields of biological science it is possible
to pursue the statistical theory of macroscopic
processes more or less independently of the "fine
structure" involved. To a great extent this is
also true of the mathematical theory of epidemics,
but itmay well be that as the subject developes,
especially where features like incubation periods
and the occurrence of clinical symptoms are concerned,
more attention will have to be paid to the biological
details than is envisaged here.
We find that in order to build a general, non-specific
disease model we must understand certain general principles of epidem-
iology, These principles provide a framework for the design. At the
point where we want to apply a general disease model to a specific
disease we must understand the biological details of the disease,
This section will attempt to present both the general
principles of epidemiology which are the backbone of the model, as
well as the specific characteristics of influenza that will influence
the calibration of the model's parameters and certain specifics of the
model itself.
2.1 General Concepts of Epidemiology
Epidemiology means either (1) the study of the behavior and
distribution of infectious diseases in a population or (2) the study
of the determinants of the incidence of the disease.2 For the most
part we are only concerned with the first meaning ,
An analysis of the various stages of the process of
infection as it affects an individual is helpful, This process is
composed of a number of stages beginning with the exposure of an indi-
vidual to infection, A susceptible is an individual who may become
infected if he is exposed to infectious material, If the exposed indi-
vidual is susceptible the infection may take hold and if it does the
process is initiated. (see Figure 1)
In the first stage of infection the infection developes
internally and no infectious material is discharged, The individual is
referred to as infected during this period but is not infective, that
is he cannot spread the infection to others, This period is called the
latent period.
At the end of the latent period, the individual is infective
and may start to communicate the infection to others, This is called
the infectious period. The generation time refers to the time from the
receipt of infection to the point of maximum infectiveness.
The individual will develop clinical symptoms at some point
after the receipt of infection. This may happen either prior to, during
or after the infectious period, The time interval between receipt of
infection and the appearance of clinical symptoms is called the incubation
period, It is only after this period of time that it is possible to take
preventative measures including isolation of the infective to prevent fur-
ther spread of the disease, It should be noted that the relation of one
time period to another affects the potential for preventing an epidemic
through isolation measures alone. For example, if the infectious period
begins after the incubation period has ended, then isolation of infectives
will prevent the epidemic, It is more common however that the infectious
period precedes the appearance of clinical symptoms requiring the use of
preventative measures such as vaccination in order to prevent the
epidemic spread.
Individual B
Susceptibility Period Latent Period Infectious
Period
Incubation Period
Moment of
Infection of B
Individual A
Momeit of
Infection of A
First Appearance
of Clinical
Symptoms
FIGURE 1
The Stages of Infection (From Dietz,, 1967, p. 506)
An important consideration in modeling the spread of disease
is the chance that an infective individual infects nearby susceptible
individuals. This chance is a function of the amount of infectious
material which is discharged, the closeness of the contact, the resistance
of the susceptibles and the virulence of the disease organism, These
characteristics will differ among diseases, age groups and communities,
An individual may develop immunity to a disease in a number
of ways and as a result will not develop infection in any contact with an
infective individual, First, previous exposure to the particular disease
organism will provide some degree of biological immunity. This degree
and duration of the immunity depend upon the magnitude of the previous
exposure, the length of time elapsed since the exposure and the type
of disease, Measles for example, provides lifetime immunity after the
first encounter.
Second, it is possible that the individual has some natural
resistance based on health, age or diet. For example, we often speak of
how a bad diet and lack of sleep can lower resistance to colds.
Third, immunity may also be conferred by vaccination, This
will provide varying degrees of immunity depending on the actual type
of vaccine, the dosage and the disease organism. This is really a subset
of the first way of developing immunity because vaccination is a controlled
exposure to the infective agent.
2.2 Epidemic Influenza
Epidemic influenza is well known for its abrupt appearance,
rapid spread through a population and its rapid disappearance, Epidemics
have been observed to spread through an entire country in one month,3
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Influenza epidemics historically occur from September
through March in the Northern Hemisphere, This may be due more to the
change in life styles that occur with a change in season than anything
inherently associated with the weather, It has been observed for example
that September is the month that schools open, bringing together many
susceptibles in close contact, During the summer months in the Northern
Hemisphere crowds are less likely to gather indoors,
Epidemic influenza usually results in many illnesses
(morbidity) and relatively few deaths (mortality), Deaths are usually
limited to the elderly or chronically ill individuals, Deaths of persons
over 55 have accounted for over three quarters of the total deaths from
epidemics in the last thirty years,4 The major exception to the observa-
tion that most deaths occur among the elderly was the 1918-1919 pandemic,
Many of those who died then were healthy young adults,
Modern knowledge of the virus agents which cause influenza
in humans dates back to the 1930's, It has since been discovered that
virus agents seem to fall into three groups, These groups are referred
to as virus types and the types are A, B and C, Within each type a multi-
tude of strains of virus exist, These strains and types differ in the
severity of the epidemics that they produce, their chemical makeup and
therefore the antibodies that can neutralize the infection, Within a
type and among the different strains of a type there is some degree of
similarity, Epidemics have tended to develop from the A or B type
virus. Type B tends to cause local outbreaks and is rarely responsible
for a world-wide epidemic.5
There is a tendency for one strain to dominate for a period
of time that may be as long as a decade. A major problem in epidemic in-
fluenza control has been the ability of the virus strain to shift in
structure. This shift makes it difficult to anticipate what virus strain
will circulate in a given year and therefore how best to counteract it,
In addition, this ability to change patterns allows a virus to survive
in a population that has developed immunity to the virus through exposure.
One theory is that a family of virus creates such immunity
in ten years that it is no longer able to spread, Under the pressure of
population immunity the virus undergoes "'antigenic shift,"6
2.3 The Spread of Influenza
The rapidness of the spread of influenza is a function of the
relatively short incubation period of about one day, For example,
while in measles most secondary cases occur within ten or fourteen days
of the original case, in influenza most occur within five days,7
Another factor in the rapid spread is the ease with which
the virus is shed from the infected surface membranes of the respira-
tory tract of an infective individual. This virus is transmitted to others
by direct contact either through droplet infection (coughing) or through
contact with objects which have been in contact with the nose or throat
discharges of an infective individual. 8
Shedding of virus begins about one day after exposure
to infection (the latent period). This shedding may continue for up to
seven days.9 A study done by the Commission on Acute Respiratory Diseases
(1948) found that virus was detectable from day one to day seven of the
disease. The following figure was developed from that study and indicates
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the frequency of isolation of virus from patients by the day of the
disease.
70 -
Frequency 60 
-
of 50 -
Isolation 40 
-
30 -
20
10
0 -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Day of the Disease
FIGURE 2
Frequency of Isolation of Influenza A Virus
from Patients (in %) According to Day of the Disease
(From Zhdanov, 1958, p, 711)
It is wrong however to assume that the period during which
an individual is infective is the same as the period during which virus
is found in the tissues. Experiments with mice have shown that influenza
transmission was highest during the first 24 hours of the disease. After
this point infected animals did not infect others although high amounts
of virus were found in the lungs and throat smears were positive,10
It is possible that some infective individuals are more
infective than others. This theory was based on a study involving the
isolation of influenza virus in infective individuals, Some individuals
definitely shed mode infectious material than others,11
2.4 Immunity to Influenza
Susceptibility to influenza appears to be universal, Immunity
to influenza results from previous exposure and infection by a virus,
This immunity is thought to be specific to the virus type although some
cross-immunity exists among the strains within a type,
There is little consensus on the duration of immunity. This
is due in part to the tendency of new strains to replace old ones and
also to the complexity of the antibody response in humans.
Studies have shown a strong relation between the antibody
level of the body and the ability to resist infection,12 One author
states,
It has long been accepted that resistance to influenza
virus infection manifested during epidemics or induced
by deliberate innoculation is in some way related to
the presence of serum antibodies capable of neutral- 13izing the virus.
There appears to be a threshold effect in influenza immunity.
It was observed that individuals with antibodies in excess of a designated
level were less likely to become infected than those with levels falling
below that level, 14
Antibodies usually occur in people on the seventh day of
the disease. One author notes that the level of antibodies usually drops
to its pre-infection level after a period of eight to twelve months, 15
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Other experimental studies in man have shown that four months after induced
infection with a B type virus, about one-third of the subjects became ill
again when sprayed with the same virus.16 Yet other studies have isolated
antibodies in individuals to a virus that was not thought to have circul-
ated for sixty years, 17
The doctrine of "original antigenic sin" seems to account
for the difference in antibody levels and resistance to infection by
particular viruses among different age groups. This doctrine states that
the dominant antibody which characterizes a particular age group is the
antibody to the family of virus which was first encountered in childhood,
This remains the dominant antibody through the age group's lifetime
because this antibody appears to build up with any subsequent exposures
to the original or related strains, 18
The result of the existence of "original antigenic sin" is
the development of gaps in antibody coverage among the various age groups.
It is possible that this is what allows the recycling of epidemic viruses
that has been observed, The 1957 Asian epidemic virus was thought by many
to reflect an example of virus resurgence, Most experts believe that this
virus was responsible for a pandemic in the 1890's, This conclusion was
reached after high antibody levels to the 1957 Asian virus were found in
persons 75 to 85 years of age, 9
An additional complexity in immunity comes in that immunity
on the community level is thought to differ from immunity on the individual
level. It has been observed that stable (therefore non-urban) communities
often acquire immunity to a particular virus for a period of three or
four years after a serious outbreak in that community.20 High prevelance
of influenza within a community in one epidemic usually seems to have
a protective effect upon prevelance in an epidemic a year later,21
This observation could be empirical support for the theory that there is
a threshold level of susceptible individuals that must exist if an
epidemic is to start.
2.5 Age Group Differences in Morbidity and Mortality
Most of the data that is available on previous influenza
epidemics shows great variation in attack rate (or morbidity or incidence)
in different epidemics. Influenza epidemics differ greatly in severity
but these differences may usually be traced to either (1) differences
in the population in terms of susceptibility, (2) differences in the
primary virus agent or (3) differences in environmental conditions or a
combination of the above. 22 As one author states
The development of influenza epidemics, the
morbidity rate and the mortality rate in
considerable measure are determined by the
character of contact between people, the
living and working conditions and the 23
condition of immunity in the population.
It is also observed that great variation occurs between
age groups in the same epidemic, This variation can be attributed to
differences in immunity and opportunity for exposure.
Althought it is dangerous to generalize, individuals above
40 years of age seem to show greater resistance to epidemic viruses.24
Children to the age of 15, primarily those between the ages of five and
15, show attack rates that are usually three to four times as great as
those of adults.25 The incidence level usually falls from the age of 15
to 25 and then rises from age 25 to 34, From the age of 40 on there is
usually a steady decline in incidence, 26
The greater resistance of the older age group is in part
related to experience with virus strains, This experience provides a
broader based antibody level. 27
There is no doubt however that opportunity for exposure
differs between age groups, The best example is that of the school,
The crowding in this environment results in very high attack rates when
infection is introduced into a group of school children, During
epidemics with a general attack rate of 5% to 10%, British boarding
schools regularly experience rates of over 60%.28 Another author notes
that there is a consistently sharp increase in common respiratory disease
rates after schools open,29
The following table details data that was collected from the
practice of a family doctor in London.30 This data is not useful for
determining actual attack rates among the population because it only
records cases that were seen by
for analyzing age variations in
----------
Year Virus Agent 0 10
1957 A/Asian 27 36
1959 A/Asian 25 18
1961 A/Asian 1 2
1966 B + A/Asian 14 5
1967- A/Asian 16 6
1968
1969
1970
A/Hong Kong
A/Hong Kong
a doctor, The data is useful
various epidemics,
--- Age------------
20 30 40 50 60 70
18 13 12 10 9 4
14 14 11 11 8 4
4 4 4 6 3 2
6 8 5 6 4 3
4 3 5 9 14 10
1.2 1,4 1,1
3 4 3
2,2
8
1,6 ,3
8 4
Attack Rates (Per 100)
TABLE 1.
By Age From the Practice
(From Fry, J,, 1958)
23
of a London Doctor
however
Total
17
14
3
7
8
1.3
5
It is apparent that in later episodes of the same virus
agent that the age distribution of incidence changes. If we refer to
Table 1 and compare the first appearance of A/Asian which occurred in
1957 with the A/Asian at the end of the decade (1967-1968) we note the
much higher incidence among elderly in 1967-1968. Incidence for the
ten to 40 age group has definitely fallen. A more general observation
is that the incidence becomes much more distributed in later episodes
of the same virus.31
Most influenza epidemics are accompanied by a significant
increase not only in excess deaths due specifically to influenza and
pneumonia but excess deaths due to all other causes as well, in particular
cardiovascular-related causes. Actually deaths which are directly attri-
butable to influenza constitute only a fraction (20% to 25%) of the
mortality in an influenza epidemic.
Mortality rates in influenza epidemics have greatly decreased
in the last sixty years due to advances in chemotherapy,32 The following
table presents the excess death rates for particular years.
Year Excess Mortality (per 100,000 population)
1918-1919 600
1928-1929 44,4
1936-1937 18,4
1943-1944 14,4
1953 6.9
TABLE 2.
Excess Mortality From Influenza and Pneumonia
During Selected Influenza Epidemic Years
(From Francis, 1965, p. 715)
We find a strikingly different age distribution pattern for
influenza mortality than for morbidity, In epidemics over the last thirty
years, over three-fourths of the deaths have been in persons over 55 years
of age. The only exception to this pattern in recent history was in the
pandemic of 1918-1919 when young adults were the most affected.
The following table details the age distribution of
influenza deaths in England and Wales for certain years,
Age Group 1918 1919 1929 1933 1943 1951 1957 1960 1969
55 and over 14 25 63 60 76 89 73 80 84
under 55 86 75 37 40 24 11 27 20 16
TABLE 3,
Distribution (%) of Influenza Deaths By
Age In England and Wales for Selected Years
(From Stuart-Harris, 1976, p. 117)
2.6 Unanswered Questions
Some of the major unanswered questions about influenza include
how the virus maintains itself between epidemic and how or why an epidemic
actually starts. These questions arise from observations that in some
cases influenza spreads geographically from city to city or from country
to country. In other cases however influenza suddenly appears over a large
area simultaneously. The observation of a sudden appearance simultaneously
in different locations has resulted in a theory that the virus is seeded
in a population and remains latent until something sparks its activation.33
This "something" might be a rise in the contact between individuals or a
rise in the susceptibility of the population. Many other theories exist
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however, One of the more striking is the theory proposed by a Russian
named Chizhevskiy in 1927 which attributes periodic influenza epidemics
to sunspots! 34
Another perplexing epidemiological question has to do with
the widely observed phenomenon of an epidemic dying out before all
susceptible individuals have become infected, Some individuals have
proposed that this suggests the presence of some non-specific blocking
factor which interferes with the transmission of the virus by preventing
reproduction of the virus. 35
THE DISEASE MODEL
3.1 General Epidemic Models
Mathematical epidemiology consists of two branches: the study
of large-scale phenomena and the study of smallescale phenomena, The
first is concerned with what happens in a large population and the second
is concerned with what happens in households or within small communities,
This thesis is concerned with the first because the individual who
makes decisions about epidemic control programs is dealing with a large-
scale phenomena,
Mathematical epidemiological models may be deterministic or
stochastic, The deterministric models are composed of differential
equations to describe the size of various groups within the population
as a function of time, These groups which contain all individuals in the
society are the susceptibles, the infectives and the immunes, Deterministic
models focus on the expected values of the parameters in the model,
Stochastic models on the other hand deal with probability
distributions for the size of these groups as a function of time and
use probability distributions for the parameters in the model rather than
expected values. Stochastic models tend to be important when we are
interested in studying small-scale phenomena, As Bailey states,
In spite of the mathematical difficulties of stochastic
treatments one can hardly avoid them for dealing with
small groups, where large statistical fluctuations are
likely to occur. When groups are sufficiently large
however, we can try to make use of deterministic approx- 36imations, but some caution is needed in doing this,
Stochastic models may be superior to deterministic models even
in large scale situations because they allow for the possibility of the
extinction of a group of infectives,37 Deterministic models assume that
an epidemic will occur if a virus is present and if certain initial cond-
itions are satisfied with regard to the size of the susceptible population.
A stochastic model however allows for extinction even when these initial
conditions are met.
In spite of the advantages offered by a stochastic model,
the model that is presented in this thesis is a deterministic model,
This is largely due to the lower level of complexity that is present in
deterministic models. We also assume that a deterministic model can
adequately model a large population,
For a good synopsis of the historical development of
epidemiological models see The Mathematical Theory of Epidemics by
Bailey (1957).
3.2 A Verbal Description
The model presented and anlyzed here is a Kermack-McKendrik
disease model that was first developed in 1927,38 This model is
deterministic, as opposed to stochastic or probabilistic, and defines
the spread of an epidemic in a closed population, A closed population
implies that there are no newcomers to the population during the course
of the epidemic and that there is no death except from the epidemic.
The model consists of a set of differential equations which de-
fine the change in specific subgroups of the population over time, The
subgroups of the population which the model recognizes are (1) the
susceptibles, those who may be infected by the disease, (2) the infected/
infectives, those who have the disease and (3) the immunes, The immune
subgroup consists of individuals who have been infected/infective and are
now dead, recovered or isolated, individuals who have been successfully
immunized and individuals who have some natural immunity for some reason.
The model assumes that at some initial time a small group of
infectives is introduced into a population which formerly consisted of
susceptibles and immunes. Those who are susceptible to the disease may
come into contact with the infectives and thereby become a member of the
infected/infective subgroup themselves, The latent period is assumed
to be one day, so newly infected individuals will begin infecting others
the day after they are infected. The susceptibles will become infective
at a rate that is proportional to the fraction of susceptibles and
the fraction of infectives in the population,
At the same time, those who are infective will die, recover
or be isolated and will cease to be infective thereby becoming a member
of the immune population. They will become immune at a rate that is
proportional to the number of infectives in the population,
The dynamics of the epidemic that results from this simple
model are dependent upon four parameters. These parameters are the
initial size of the infective population, the initial size of the immune
population, the contact rate parameter and the removal rate parameter.
The contact rate parameter measures the number of close contacts
an average individual has per day that would result in the passing of the
disease if one of the individuals were susceptible and one of the individuals
were infective. This parameter specifies how quickly people move from the
susceptible population to the infective population, In this model we
consider the contact rate to be constant throughout the course of the
epidemic, It seems clear however, and this will be discussed later, that
this parameter could be better modeled as a function of time or as a
function of the size of the epidemic, This model also uses one contact
rate that is an average of the contact rates specific to all groups in the
population.
3.3 The Basic Assumptions
In this model we assume that the population is closed with
no newcomers (either births or immigrants), and no migrations or non-
epidemic deaths. This assumption is not an unrealistic one when we
consider the short time-horizon of an epidemic,
We also assume that individuals within the population may be
classified as either susceptibles, infectives or immunes, We do not
allow for different levels of susceptibility among individuals, We do
not allow for different levels of infectiveness among individuals or groups.
We also assume the uniform mixing of susceptibles and infectives
in the population, Uniform mixing is unlikely however in reality, There
are obviously different levels of mixing from the family to the school
to the community level, In this model we are forced however to find a
contact rate parameter that is a complicated average value of all the
contact rates associated with different levels of mixing in the population,
One argument for assuming uniform exposure for all groups is that during
an epidemic the virus is so widespread that everyone has been adequately
exposed, It should be pointed out that by making this assumption we are
ascribing the differences in attack rates among age groups to differing
30
levels of immunity resulting from past experience with related strains of
the virus.
We assume that the contact rate and the removal rate are
constants throughout the epidemic period, They are assumed not to vary
over time or with the size of the epidemic,
We assume that the latent period (the period before an infected
individual becomes infective) is one day, An individual will become in-
fective with probability one the day after he is infected,
The period over which an infective is spreading infection is
modeled as a negative exponential distribution, If the removal rate is
y then the mean length of this infective period is 1/y,
An individual who recovers, is isolated or is initially immune
remains immune for the duration of the epidemic,
Most of the above assumptions will be discussed further,
3.4 The Equations
The model is composed of three equations which describe the
change in the susceptible population, the change in the infective pop-
ulation and the change in the immune population respectively as a function
of time.
(1) dS
dt
(2) d.
dt
(3) dR
dt
S represents the susceptible population as a fraction of the
total population, I represents the infectives population as a fraction
of the total population and R represents the immune population as a
fraction of the total population, We use to refer to the contact rate,
and y to refer to the removal rate. We define y/ as the relative
removal rate, and S/y as the relative contact rate, It is important
to note that in this formulation of the model we refer to fractions of the
population and not actual numbers.
The initial conditions for this model are:
S = 1 - I0 - R0
I = I0
R = R
We constrain the populations to be greater than zero and less than one.
0 s S s 1
0 I 1
0 R 1
3.5 The Parameters
3.5.1 The Removal Rate
The removal rate parameter is y and this parameter measures the
length of time an infective individual remains a part of the infective
population in the model, This model assumes that a proportion (y) of the
infective population is removed to the immune population per day,
This constant proportion removal assumes that the infective period
is distributed as a negative exponential, The mean of this function (the
mean length of time an individual remains infective) is 1/y. (The proof
of this statement is found in Appendix A,)
The length of time an individual remains "infective" in this
model is related to the actual, medical clinical period of infectiveness
and any isolation measures an infective might be subject to including
quarantine and bed disability,
This model uses one removal rate for the entire population. In
reality different individuals and different groups within the population
will have different removal rates, For example, older individuals may be
be isolated earlier than younger individuals because they are at more
risk of complications from infection,
The removal rate used here is also constant over time. In reality
this may not be true. As Dietz noted, the removal rate will probably increase
over time (the mean time an individual is infective will become shorter)
because over the course of an epidemic the isolation measures of public
health authorities become more effecient,39
3.5.2 The Initial Immune Population
The initial size of the immune population reflects the fraction
of the population that will not become infected by the virus with probability
of one. This immunity may be the result of previous exposure to the virus,
or a closely related strain. Immunity may also be conferred as the result
of successful vaccination,
The relationship between the size of the epidemic (the attack
rate) and the initial level of immunes is described by the following:
d AR 1 e( /y).(-AR)
d RO0 (R/y). (1-RO0),e (S/y)9-(-AR)
We use AR to refer to the attack rate or the size of the epidemic as
a percentage of the total population, The initial immune population
is represented by R0. This relationship is partly derived in the section
3,6.1, A full derivation is found in Appendix A.
This equation indicates that we can change the size of the
epidemic if we change the size of the initial immune population. As we
see later however, depending on the size of the initial population of
immunes and the relationship between the contact rate and the removal rate,
we can lower the size of the epidemic by more than the increase in the
size of the initial immunes. This is referred to as "herd immunity."
When we immunize one individual we not only prevent that individual
from becoming infected but we lower the chances that people he has contact
with will become infected.
3.5.3 The Contact Rate Parameter
The contact rate parameter (.) specifies the average number of
contacts an individual has per day in close enough proximity to pass the
disease if he were infective and the other individuals were susceptible.
There are many concepts embedded in the contact rate parameter,
There is clearly an element of chance involved in the communication of a
virus from an infective to a susceptible individual, Bailey states,
The magnitude of this chance may depend on the
virulence of the organisms, the extent to which
they are discharged, the natural resistance of the
susceptibles, the degree of the latter's proximity40to the infective and so on,
Clearly the "adequate contact rate" varies from group.
Certain environments as schools, military barracks and families are
conducive to the spread of influenza,
In addition there is some evidence that there are different
degrees of infectiveness.
Some persons with influenza yield virus in higher
titres from the throat than the average. This
might suggest that some infected persons are more 41infectious than others.
This model however, uses a single contact rate that represents a weighted
average of all contact rates.
It is likely that the average contact rate changes over time
in response to environmental conditions, This change could be prompted by
the season. It seems likely that there is more chance of adequate contact
for spread of infection in the winter months when most contacts are in closed
areas than in the summer months when many contacts are in the outdoors.
In addition the average contact rate may change as an epidemic progresses
and individuals are more cautious about being in contact with an infective.
This model however, uses a contact rate that is constant over time.
3.6 Theoretical Analysis
3.6.1 The Size of the Epidemic
To solve the equations and obtain the size of the epidemic as
a percentage of the population (the attack rate) we proceed as follows:
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L 4 -(Rt R0)
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inS
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Continuting on we obtain:
(/y) 
- (RtRO
(- /y).- (R t-RO0
e6n(S t /S 0 )
(6) St = S 0*e
To determine the value of S at t = c, S0 we note that at the
end of the epidemic, So + Ro = 1 because there are no infectives left at
that time. Using equation (6) we then write:
(-/y)-(R - RO) (g/y)%(S + R 1
So = S 0#e 0 e-0
(4) dS
dR
dS
St
0
dS
S
in St
If we know S, R0, f and y, we can determine S, as the root of the
following equation:
(7) S0 e(/y).(S + R0 SO = 0
We can determine the root of this equation by using the approximation:
Sn+ 1  S n nf(Sn
f'(S )
After determining So, by solving for the root of equation (7)
we can determine the size of the epidemic (the attack rate) as:
Attack Rate = S0  ~ So
That is, the attack rate is simply the fraction of susceptibles at the
beginning minus the fraction of susceptibles at the end of the epidemic.
Table 4 lists the results that were obtained from using the
method outlined above with the removal rate (y) equal to .5, with
the initial infectives (IO) equal to ,00001% of the population and with
varying levels of the contact rate (g) and the initial immune population
(R0 = 1 - S0 - 10). The table lists the attack rate for the various
combinations of the parameters.
A graph of the attack rates found using this method plotted
against the initial immunes with a removal rate of ,5 and with various
contact rates is found in Figure 3. The same graph with a removal rate of
.33 is found in Figure 4.
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3.6.2 The Size of the Epidemic Depends on the
Size of the Initial Immune Population
The change in the attack rate for a change in the initial immune
population is the slope of the lines in Figures 3 and 4, In order to
determine this relationship we first determine how the size of the
susceptible population at the end of the epidemic (S.) changes as the
size of the initial immune population (R0) changes, This will give us
dAR
dRO , the value in terms of lowered attack rate of one more initially
immune individuals.
We determine that (see Appendix A for the full derivation):
p(SM+ R0  1)
(8) dS (p-p 0-1) e
pi (So+ R0 - 1)
dR0  (p-p-R 0 )-e -1
In this equation we use p to represent the relative contact rate S/y.
To calculate we observe that AR = S -S and thatdR 0  0
S + RO ~ 1. This means that S = 0 - AR. We then conclude that
p (-AR)
(9) dAR 1 - e'
p (-AR)
dR0  (1-RO e1
Although we cannot prove so analytically, if we observe Figure 3, we see
that dAR is approximately the same for different values of the contact rate
0
at a given attack rate,
3.6.3 The Size of the Epidemic Depends on the
the Relative Contact Rate
We have definedthe relative contact rate (p) as /y, By
referring to equation (7) we see that the attack rate is a function of
this relative contact rate, We also see from equation (9) that the
change in the attack rate with respect to initial immunes is also a
function of the relative contact rate.
These observations imply that (1) the size of the epidemic
(the attack rate) is dependent only on the relative contact rate and
is independent of the values of either the contact rate ( ) or the
removal rate (y); and (2) given two different combinations of and
y that result in epidemics with similar attack rates and where
y y2
the value of an additional immune in terms of reduced attack rate will be
the same in both cases,
3.6.4 The Threshold Theorem
Equation (2) states the change in infectives as:
dI y
dt
From this equation we can show that in order for the change in
infectives to be positive the following relationship must hold:
.S-I > y-I
This reduces to: S > y/,
From this we can conclude that if the initial susceptible
population is less than y/ then the epidemic will fadeout because the
change in the infective population will be negative. Therefore, a
necessary condition for an epidemic to occur is that the initial suscep-
tible population be greater than the relative removal rate (y/ ),
We can also conclude from the above analysis that the maximum
level of infectives during the epidemic will occur at the point where
the susceptible population is equal to this removal rate, This is
because at this point the change in infectives will become negative.
RESULTS OF THE COMPUTER MODEL
4.1 The Computer Model
The mathematical model presented in the previous section was
developed into a package of interactive computer programs written in
APL. This allowed the model to be run many times using different values
for the basic parameters. For specified values of the basic parameters,
the computer model produces (1) the size of the epidemic (the attack rate)
as a percentage of the population as a whole and as a percentage of the
susceptible population, (2) the maximum infective population for a one
day period, (3) the duration of the epidemic in days and (4) a detailed
account of the course of the epidemic day by day, in terms of the size of
the different populations and the change in the size of the populations.
The computer model also includes programs that enable sensi-
tivity analysis to be performed on any of the following parameters:
initial infectives, initial immunes, the contact rate and the removal
rate. In addition, the computer-based system provides a plotting capabil-
ity.
Although the analysis of the disease model that is presented
here excludes the concept of groups of the population such as high-risk
or low-risk, or various age categories, computer programs were written
to allow the capability to partially extend the analysis in this way.
Although these programs still allow only one contact rate (that is a
weighted average of the group contact rates) the age-specific analysis
is possible by assuming varying levels of immunity between groups, We
assume therefore that any difference in the attack rate among groups is
due to differing immunity levels, This ignores the issue of different
exposure opportunities but this would require the use of a model with
multiple contact rates. This type of model, while it may be preferable,
was not attempted because of the added complexity this would involve,
Section 6.2 elaborates on the issue of multi-group analysis,
The results that were obtained from the computer model are
approximately equal to the results obtained analytically in Section 3,
Any differences are attributable to the stopping conditions which are
built into the computer programs.
The computer program stopping conditions state that the
epidemic is to be considered over if the size of the infective population
is decreasing and the size of the infective population is less than the
size of the initial infective population. If the threshold limit is not
initially exceeded (S > y/ ) then the model stops after one day. In
addition, if the epidemic runs over 360 days the epidemic is considered
over.
If the size of the initial infective population is relatively
small, the ending conditions described above should not distort the results.
In general this ending condition will provide a downward bias on "small
epidemic," those that have epidemic curves that are fairly flat and that
tend to occur when the initial susceptible population is near the threshold,
If the initial infective population is assigned a value that is significantly
large the results will include the epidemic being stopped with a signi-
ficantly large infective population still existing,
The decision to stop all epidemics at the 360 day point was arbi-
trary but is usually only a constraint in a situation that is very close
to the threshold.
Appendix B contains the APL computer programs that provided
the significant portion of the analysis that follows, This appendix
also contains examples of how these programs are run.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis that was performed on the basic
parameters of the model is best illustrated by the three-dimensional
diagram in Figure 5,
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A solution of the model in terms of the attack rate, for a
removal rate of .5 and with varying contact rates and initial immunes is
presented in Figure 6. This is a comparable figure to the one that was
generated in Section 3 from the equations (Figure 3),
4,3 Sensitivity of the Model to the Contact Rate
The complete results of the sensitivity analysis on the contact
rate parameter are presented in Table 5, This table shows the results
of the computer model for various values of the contact rate and by the
level of initial immunes. The removal rate was held constant at ,5,
Included in the results in this table are (1) the attack rate as a
percentage of the total population, (2) the maximum infectives in one
day as a percentage of the total population and (3) the duration of the
simulated epidemic in days,
Analysis of the table reveals the following, As we raise
the contact rate and hold the initial immunes constant the attack rate
increases, the maximum daily infectives increases and the duration of the
epidemic decreases, By raising the contact rate, holding everything else
constant we are creating a more explosive epidemic.
It is also interesting to note that as we raise the contact
rate the threshold level for initial immunes rises (or the threshold level
for susceptibles drops), For example for a contact rate of 1,0, the
threshold is 50%. This means that the initial immune level must rise to
50% to prevent an epidemic, For a contact rate of .85, the initial immune
threshold level is 41%, that is, the epidemic is avoided if the initial
immune level can be raised to 41% through vaccination,
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Referring back to Figure 6, we see that for a given attack rate
the change in the attack rate as we change the initial immune population
is similar for contact rates that are relatively similar,
In conclusion, we see that as we vary the contact rate we
radically change the nature of the simulated epidemic, For example,
with a contact rate of 1,5 and an initial immune level of 10%, we
produce an epidemic with and attack rate of 85%, maximum daily infectives
of 28% and duration of 54 days. If the contact rate is .80 with other
parameters the same the simulated epidemic has an attack rate of 66%,
maximum daily infectives of 9% and a duration of 115 days,
The epidemic curves that result from various contact rates
with a removal rate of .5 and initial immunes of 40% is presented in
Figure 7. This figure indicates how much more explosive an epidemic
becomes as the contact rate is increased. Figure 8 presents a similar
picture for initial immunes of 30%,
4.4 Sensitivity of the Model to the Initial Immunes
We can see from Table 5 of the previous section the sensitivity
of the model's results to the initial immune parameter. The sensitivity
of this variable is the most interesting because its value can be manip-
ulated through public vaccination programs more easily than can the value
of the removal rate or the contact rate,
We see from Table 5 that the level of the initial immunes
has a great effect on the characteristics of the epidemic, For example,
for a contact rate of .9 and a removal rate of ,5, we can lower the
attack rate from 75,9% to 0 by raising the initial immune level from
0% to 45% of the population,
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We also see from Table 5 that the value of an jncrease in the
initial immune population becomes greater as we approach the threshold
level, For example with a contact rate of 1,0 we can reduce the attack
rate by 14.5% (from 82.8% to 68,3%) by increasing the initial immunes
from 0 to 10%. Increasing the initial immunes by 10% from 30% to 40%
of the population however, results in a reduction in the attack rate
of 16,5% (from 36.3% to 19.1%), This is a good example of the concept
of "herd immunity." We observe that as the number of immune individuals
in the population increases, the benefit from vaccinating an additional
individual increases up to the threshold level, It is important to
notethat after the threshold level has been reached there is no value
to immunizing an additional individual,
In Figure 9 we present the epidemic curves that result from
a contact rate of 1.0, a removal rate of ,5 and varying levels of initial
immunes. We see that a decrease in the level of initial immunes is
almost indistinguishable from an increase in the contact rate, based
on the results we saw in Section 4.3, In Figure 10 we present a
similar result for a contact rate of 1.25,
4,5 Sensitivity of the Model to the Removal Rate
Table 6 presents the results from the model with a contact rate
of ,85 and with variable levels of initial immunes and variable values
of the removal parameter, We note that the attack rate is more sensitive
to the removal rate at higher values of the initial immunes,
For example at the 5% initial immune level, when we vary the
removal rate from .4 to .4 we decrease the attack rate by 15% (from 78,5%
to 63.7%). At an initial immune level of 30% however when we vary the
54
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Solution of the Model for Contact Rate of .85,
With Varying Removal Rates and Initial Immunes
40 1 45 ,
removal rate from ,4 to ,5, the attack rate decreases by 20% (from 41%
to 21%,)
Figure 11 presents a graph of the attack rate versus the
initial immune level from the results in Table 6. In conclusion we
see that as we raise the removal rate, the attack rate and maximum
daily infectives both decrease, There does not seem to be a simple
pattern to the effect of the removal rate on the duration of the
epidemic, based on the results in Table 6, It seems however to
make sense that as the removal rate decreases the epidemic becomes
more explosive and will tend to be over quickly. This is seen in
Table 6 for all values of the removal rate except between ,33 and .25,
At this pointathe duration increases.
The model that has been presented has assumed an infective
period with a negative exponential distribution and a mean period of
1/y where y is the removal rate, This says that a constant proportion
of infectives are removed from the infective population to the immune
population each day.
An alternative description of the infective period that we
have not considered is one of constant length, In this case, individuals
would remain infective for 1/y days after which time they become immune,
Although this is difficult to analyze mathematically, it is
possible to program this interpretation, This was done in order to
determine what the effect would be on the results of the model, The
detailed results of this analysis for a contact rate of 1,0 is presented
in Table 7, In Table 8 we present a typical comparison between the
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Solution of Model for Contact Rate of 1,
With Varying Initial Immunes and Infective Periods of Constant Length
18.2
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9.5
331
0
1
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results of the model using the two different types of infective period,
In Table 8, we use a contact rate of ,8 and a removal rate of .5
for the exponential distribution and a removal rate of 2 for the constant
length infective period. It is important to note that the mean infective
period for a removal rate of ,5 using the exponential distribution is
2 days, As can be seen from the table, the attack rates do not
change significantly. We notice however that the constant length
infective period results in epidemics of much shorter duration but
with higher levels of the maximum daily infective population. The
epidemic curve would be much more of a spike for the constant length
period.
4.6 Sensitivity of the Model to the Initial Infectives
The initial infective parameter should be defined as a
small enough value that it presents a realistic picture of the situation
before an epidemic has begun, The results that are presented in this
thesis are based in most cases on an initial population that is ,00001%
of the overall population.
We find that by varying the initial infectives, the only
characteristic of the epidemic that is significantly affected is the
timing or the duration. The samller the size of the initial infective
population the longer it takes for an epidemic to build up and therefore
the longer the duration.
The attack rate does not vary to any great extent if the
level of the initial infectives is kept between .01% (21,200 people) of
the population to .000001% (2 people) of the population, The analysis
Exponential Infective
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Mean of 2 Days
Constant Infective
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66.2
8.8
115
67.0
11.9
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TABLE 8
Comparison of Model Results with Contact Rate of .8,
Using Two Different Types of Infective Period
0 !
presented here was based on a figure of ,0001% (21 people) of the popu-
lation,
The variance that is noted in the attack rate as the level of
initial infectives changes is a function of the ending condition of the
model, This ending condition stipulates that the change in infectives
be negative and smaller than the size of the initial infective population
before the simulated epidemic is stopped. For a higher initial infec-
tive population, the ending condition occurs at a higher level of the
infective population. Therefore a higher initial infective population
results in a lower attack rate and a shorter duration in this model, The
results of varying the initial infectives is shown in Table 9.
4.7 The Impact of a Constant Relative Contact Rate
According to the theory presented in Section 3,6,3, the
size of the epidemic should be independent of the actual values of the
contact rate and the removal rate but should depend only on the ratio
of these two parameters. This ratio was defined as the relative contact
rate.
We find that the computer model has slight discrepancies. In
Table 10 we show the model results for three cases where the relative
contact rate remains the same but the contact and removal rates change.
By looking down the column of initial immunes of 20%, we see that the
attack rate ranges from 39.0% to 39.3% depending on the particular
combination of the contact rate and the removal rate chosen. Also the
maximum daily infectives ranges from 3.2 to 3.3%. The duration of the
epidemic ranges from 194 to 144 days.
The combination of a contact rate of 1.0 and a removal rate of
63
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.0001
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.01
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1,0
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30,3898
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30.381
30.284
29.271
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Infectives
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1,96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.97
2.05
2.80
Duration of
Epidemic
(Days)
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211
175
140
104
67
29
TABLE 9
Solution of the Model as the Initial Infective Population is Varied
With Removal Rate of .5, Contact Rate of .85 and Initial Immunes of 25%
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y = .5 102 113 126 144 171 211 284 361 361 1
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55.6
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144
10
47.4
4.8
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15
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TABLE 10
Solution of Model for Constant Relative Contact Rate (p) of 1.7,
With Varying Initial Immunes
.5 shows the shortest duration epidemic because the higher rates force
the epidemic out quicker,
The difference in maximum infectives and attack rate is due to
the ending condition specified by the computer model. The epidemics
are forced to stop when the change in the infective population becomes
a small negative number, For a high contact rate and removal rate, the
epidemic curve will be steeper and the ending condition will have less
effect. For a lower contact rate and removal rate the epidemic curve
will be much flatter and more of the epidemic curve tail will be cut
off by the ending condition,
4.8 The Course of the Epidemic
The computer output that is available when the model is
run includes the details of the epidemic on a day-to-day basis, These
details include the sizes of the susceptible, infective and immune popu-
lations. In addition this output lists the changes to each of the three
populations each day. This output is presented in Table 11 for a
contact rate of .85, a removal rate of .5 and initial immunes of 25%,
The epidemic curve is presented in Figure 12,
TABLE 11
Course of the epidemic for 6 =
Io = .00001%
.85, y = .5, Ro= 25%, and
DAY
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
THE POPULATION------- -PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
74.99999
74.99998
74.99998
74.99997
74.99996
74.99995
74.99994
74.99992
74.99991
74.99989
74.99987
74.99985
74.99982
74.99979
74.99975
74.99972
74.99967
74.99962
74.99957
74.99950
74.99943
74.99934
74.99925
74.99914
74.99902
74.99888
74.99872
74.99853
74.99833
74.99809
74.99782
74.99752
74.99717
74.99678
74.99633
74.99582
74.99525
74.99459
74.99384
74.99299
74.99202
74.99091
74.98966
74.98824
74.98661
INFECTIVES
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00009
.00010
.00012
.00013
.00015
.00017
.00019
.00022
.00025
.00028
.00032
.00037
.00042
.00048
.00054
.00062
.00070
.00080
.00091
.00103
.00118
.00134
.00152
.00173
.00197
.00224
.00254
.00289
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES
25.00000
25.00000
25. 00001
25.00002
25.00002
25.00003
25.00004
25.00005
25.00007
25.00008
25.00010
25.00011
25.00013
25.00016
25.00018
25.00021
25.00025
25.00029
25.00033
25.00038
25.00044
25.00051
25.00058
25.00067
25.00076
25.00087
25.00100
25.00114
25.00130
25.00149
25.00170
25.00194
25.00221
25.00252
25.00287
25.00327
25.00372
25.00424
25.00482
25.00549
25.00625
25.00712
25.00810
25.00922
25.01049
INFECT IMMUNESSUSCEPT
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00003
00004
00004
.00005
.00006
.00006
00007
.00008
.00010
.00011
00012
.00014
.00016
.00018
.00021
.00024
.00027
.00030
.00035
.00039
.00045
.00051
.00058
.00066
.00075
.00085
00097
.00110
.00125
.00143
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00011
.00012
.00014
.00016
.00018
.00021
.00024
.00027
.00031
.00162 .00035 .00127
.00000
.00000
.00001
.0000"1
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00007
.00009
.00010
.00011
.00013
.00014
.00016
.00018
.00021
.00024
.00027
.00031
.00035
.00040
.00045
.00052
.00059
.00067
.00076
.00086
.00098
.00112
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--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
DAY
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
SUSCEPTIBLES
74.98477
74.98267
74.98028
74.97757
74.97448
74.97097
74.96698
74.96244
74.95728
74.95141
74.94473
74.93714
74.92852
74.91871
74.90756
74.89488
74.88048
74.86411
74.84551
74.82438
74.80039
74.77313
74.74219
74.70706
74.66720
74.62198
74.57071
74.51259
74.44674
74.37217
74.28779
74.19237
74.08454
73.96280
73.82549
73.67080
73.49676
73.30121
73.08186
72.83625
72.56180
72.25582
71. 91555
71.53821
71.12108
INFECTIVES
.00329
.00374
.00426
.00484
.00551
.00626
.00712
.00810
.00921
.01048
.01191
.01355
.01540
.01751
.01990
.02263
.02572
.02923
.03321
.03773
.04287
.04869
.05529
.06277
.07124
.08084
.09169
.10397
.11783
.13348
.15112
.17099
.19332
.21840
.24651
.27794
.31302
.35206
.39538
.44330
.49610
.55403
.61729
.68598
.76012
IMMUNES SUSCEPT
------ CHANGE IN---------
INFECT IMMUNES
25.01194
25.01359
25. 01546
25.01759
25.02001
25.02276
25.02590
25.02946
25.03351
25.03812
25.04335
25.04931
25.05608
25.06378
25.07254
25.08249
25.09380
25.10666
25.12128
25.13788
25.15675
25.17818
25.20253
25.23017
25.26156
25.29718
25.33760
25.38344
25.43543
25.49434
25. 56109
25.63665
25.72214
25. 81880
25.92800
26.05126
26.19023
26.34673
26.52276
26.72045
26.94210
27.19015
27.46717
27.77581
28.11880
.00184
.00210
.00239
.00271
.00309
.00351
.00399
.00454
.00516
.00587
.00667
.00759
.00863
.00981
.01115
.01267
.01440
.01637
.01860
.02113
.02400
.02725
.03094
.03513
.03986
.04522
.05128
.05812
.06585
.07456
.08438
.09543
.10783
.12174
.13731
.15469
.17405
.19555
.21935
.24561
.27445
.30598
.34027
.37734
.41713
.00040
.00045
.00051
.00058
.00067
.00076
.00086
.00098
.00111
.00126
.00144
.00163
.00186
.00211
.00240
.00272
.00309
.00351
.00398
.00452
.00513
.00582
.00660
.00748
.00847
.00959
.01086
.01227
.01386
.01565
.01764
.01986
.02234
.02508
.02810
.03143
.03508
.r3904
.04332
.04792
.05280
.05793
.06326
.06869
.07414
.00145
.00165
.00187
.00213
.00242
.00275
.00313
.00356
.00405
.00461
.00524
.00596
.00677
.00770
.00875
.00995
.01131
.01286
.01461
.01661
.01887
.02143
.02434
.02764
.03138
.03562
.04042
.04585
.05198
.05892
.06674
.07556
.08549
.09666
.10920
.12325
.13897
.15651
.17603
.19769
.22165
.24805
.27702
.30864
.34299
TABLE 11
-- -PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
DAY
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
SUSCEPTIBLES
70.66157
70.15730
69.60625
69.00686
68.35818
67.65996
66. 91287
66.11854
65.27966
64.40007
63.48472
62.53960
61.57167
60.58861
59.59866
58.61026
57.63186
56.67154
55.73678
54.83425
53.96964
53.14751
52.37131
51.64335
50.96488
50.33619
49.75672
49.22525
48.73998
48.29870
47.89889
47.53786
47.21282
46.92098
46.65956
46.42590
46.21745
46.03180
45.86671
45.72010
45.59005
45.47481
45.37280
45.28256
45.20280
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
.83957
92405
1.01307
1.10593
1.20165
1.29904
1.39661
1.49264
1.58520
1.67219
1.75145
1.82084
1.87836
1.92223
1.95107
1.96393
1.96037
1.94051
1.90501
1.85503
1.79213
1.71819
1.63529
1.54561
1.45128
1.35433
1.25663
1.15978
1.06516
.97387'
.88674
.80440
.72724
.65546
.58915
.52824
.47257
.42193
.37606
.33464
.29737
.26392
.23397
.20722
.18337
28.49886
28.91865
29.38067
29.88721
30.44017
31.04100
31.69052
32.38882
33.13514
33.92774
34.76383
35.63956
36.54998
37.48916
38.45027
39.42581
40.40777
41.38796
42.35821
43.31072
44.23823
45.13430
45.99339
46.81104
47.58384
48.30948
48.98665
49.61496
50.19485
50.72744
51.21437
51.65774
52.05994
52.42356
52.75129
53.04587
53.30998
53.54627
53.75724
53.94526
54.11258
54.26127
54.39323
54.51022
54.61383
INFECT IMMUNES
.45951
.50427
.55105
.59939
.64869
.69821
.74709
.79434
.83888
.87959
.91536
.94512
.96793
.98305
.98996
.98839
.97840
O.96033
.93476
.90252
O 86461
.82212
O 77620
.72796
.67847
.62870
~.57946
.53147
.48527
.44129
.39981
.36103
.32504
.29185
.26142
.23366
.20845
.18565
.16509
.14661
.13005
.11523
.10201
.09024
~.07976
.07945
.08448
.08902
.09285
.09573
.09739
.09757
.09603
.09255
.08699
.07926
.06939
.05751
.04388
.02884
.01285
.00356
.01986
.03550
~.04998
.06290
O.07394
.08290
O.08969
.09433
~.09694
.09770
O 09685
.09462
~.09130
.08712
~08234
.07716
.07177
.06631
.06091
~05567
.05064
~.04588
.04142
.03727
.03345
.02995
O.02675
.02385
.38006
.41979
.46203
.50654
.55296
.60083
.64952
.69831
.74632
.79260
.83609
.87572
.91042
.93918
.96112
.97554
.98196
.98018
.97025
.95251
.92752
.89606
.85909
.81765
.77280
.72564
.67717
.62831
.57989
.53258
.48693
.44337
.40220
.36362
.32773
.29458
.26412
.23629
.21097
.18803
.16732
.14868
.13196
.11699
.10361
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45.13234135
136
137
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92416
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.16214
.14327
.12652
.11167
.09852
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.07659
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.00768
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.00312
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.00241
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.00067
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55.25921
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.00153
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.00033
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.07164
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.03375
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.00056
.00049
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.00038
.00033
TABLE 11
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION----- ------ CHANGE IN---------
DAY
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
SUSCEPTIBLES
44.61172
44.61152
44.61135
44.61120
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FIGURE 12
New Cases Reported (% of the Population) By Day of the Epidemic Using the Computer Model
with Removal Rate of ,5, Contact Rate of .85 and Initial Immunes of 25%
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APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
5.1 Calibrating the Parameters
The influenza model describes an epidemic based upon four
variables: the contact rate, the removal rate, the initial immunes and
the initial infectives. A real-world application of this model will
require that the decision-maker determine the appropriate values of
the model variables specific to his application. The appropriate
values of the model variables will differ depending on the virulence
of the specific organism, the previous exposure of various groups
within the population to the organism and the living conditions of the
population.
The specification of parameters affects various epidemic
characteristics such as the attack rate, the maximum level of daily
infectives and the duration of the epidemic. Epidemic control pro-
grams may be aimed at controlling the attack rate of the epidemic or
may be aimed at keeping the level of infectives below a certain point.
The duration of the epidemic will affect the timing of any vaccina-
tion programs. Therefore, because the values of the parameters deter-
mine the nature of the epidemic that is simulated, they will ultimately
have an effect on the policy decision that is made.
It is only after the model variables have been specified for
the "base case" program, or the program without any vaccination program,
that alternative courses of action may be analyzed.
Several questions are raised by this process of model specifi-
cation. First, what is the "best" way to calibrate the parameters?
Second, what are the results from misspecifying a parameter, in terms
of program goals and program costs?
There seem to be two different paths to take in calibrating
parameters. The first is to attempt to put values (or a range of values)
on the various parameters based upon the actual phenomenon which the
parameter is attempting to model. In other words, to specify a para-
meter value based upon the "pure" understanding of the parameter and
not upon any preconceived idea of what its effect will be on the
epidemic in terms of the shape of the epidemic curve, the attack rate,
the duration, and so on.
The second method of calibration involves finding parameter
values that result in a model epidemic whose characteristics have al-
ready been defined. As decision-makers, we may feel it reasonable to
assume that the epidemic will have a certain attack rate, be of a
certain duration and result in a certain epidemic curve. We then
calibrate the parameters by determining various combinations that will
result in a similar type of epidemic.
The two different methods of calibrating the model would seem
to result from two distinct uses of the model. First, we may wish to
define the values of the parameters and then see the resulting epidemic
that would occur by running the model with those parameters. Second,
we may wish to define the epidemic characteristics first and let the
parameter values be determined as required to demonstrate that parti-
cular epidemic. Both uses might eventually result in the use of the
model with calibrated parameters to analyze alternative courses of
action such as different vaccination programs.
In reality, a decision-maker will want to make use of all
of the information at his disposal. He will therefore specify a model
using a combination of the approaches outlined above. A health official
who is concerned about a potential influenza epidemic will have some idea
of the type of virus which is likely to cause the epidemic and will be
able to draw conclusions about the contact rate, removal rate and
initial immunes from that. In addition, he will have some knowledge of
past epidemics, their size and duration and perhaps some feeling for
the potential size of the epidemic. This knowledge will allow him to
better define the parameters to produce what he feels is a reasonable
"base case" for the influenza. As was noted before, the base case
refers to the effects of an epidemic with no vaccination program.
The power of the model will come then in analyzing various
programs and their effect on the outcome of the epidemic, based on
the previously calibrated parameters.
5.2 Calibration of the Removal Rate
Analytically, the removal rate represents the reciprocal of
the mean length of time an individual remains part of the infective
population before he recovers, is isolated or loses his ability to
infect others.
A reasonable starting point or limit to the length of time
an individual is infecting other people is the epidemiological "infec-
tious period". After this point, an individual may no longer infect.
An individual who is still medically infectious may be removed
from the infective population by isolation. This isolation might be
the result of quarantine, doctor's orders or just being bed-disabled.
Although quarantine is not relevant to the influenza situation, the other
two situations are.
For influenza, the epidemiological infectious period is
between one and six days based on the presence of virus in the tissues.
However, as discussed in Secti-on 7, studies have shown declining levels
of virus from day one of the disease. Maximum communicability is
thought to occur within the first two days. For this reason, a removal
rate resulting in a model infective period of two to three days is
suggested. An appropriate range for the removal rate is therefore
.5 to .33.
5.3 Calibration of the Initial Immunes
Determining a range of possible values for the size of the
initial immune population is an important part of specifying the model.
The initial immunes will depend on the relative sizes of the various
age groups, the particular virus in question and the history of pre-
vious exposure of the population to this or similar virus strains. The
initial immunes level can also be affected by vaccination programs.
Initially, it might seem possible to determine the size of the
immune population empirically. As noted in Section 2, however, antibody
levels are correlated, though not perfectly, with immunity in humans.
In studies conducted in the early 1950's, influenza anti-
bodies were measured in various population groups in order to determine
the previous occurrence of virus. A concluding comment in a report
76
that was made on these studies states
It is not unreasonable to expect that the same
approach may be useful in predicting the sus-
ceptibility of a population to a particular
virus. 42
In other words, it is possible that if a sampling of the
antibody levels of representative groups in the population showed low
levels to a particular virus, this might suggest a certain suscepti-
bility in the population.
At the same time, it does not appear that our understanding
of influenza immunity has advanced far enough or that this method has
been perfected enough for this to be more than an indicator.
The statement in the study mentioned above concludes
While the measurement of influenzal antibodies
may provide a valuable yard-stick for estimating
susceptibility of a given population to a given
virus, it should be noted that the relationship
between ant ody titre and immunity is not always
consistent.
5.4 Calibration of the Contact Rate
The contact rate, , is meant to represent on average
the number of individuals an infective person would meet per day in
close enough contact to spread the virus, if the other individuals
were susceptible. The contact rate in this influenza model must
represent the average contact rate for a number of different groups
with different lifestyles and therefore different opportunities for
exposure. It is the fact that this parameter is an average that makes
it very difficult to calibrate independently of the model.
Initially, however, we might specify a likely range for
the contact rate from 0 to 5. This will depend on the particular
virus, on the season in which the epidemic is likely to hit, as
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well as the living conditions of the community in question.
Few authors have attempted to determine the contact rate,
even within a smaller group of people. We do find one reference to this
concept, however. Burnet notes that the 1957 epidemic of Asian flu
in Melbourne, Australia "burned out when about 45% of the people had
been infected as judged by a rise in antibody."44 This epidemic lasted
between six and eight weeks. Burnet calculated that each infected
person had transmitted the influenza to an average of 1.2 other persons.
If we assume that the average period over which an individual was infec-
tive was two days, we could conclude that the contact rate was some-
thing over .6. It is not .6 because the contact rate refers not only to
individuals who an infective on average will infect, but the number
of close contacts an infective has per day that could result in passing
of the virus if the other individual was susceptible.
A more practical method for determining the contact rate
would be to run the model with values of the other parameters specified
and attempt to produce an epidemic curve with a particular attack rate,
maximum daily infectives and duration.
For example, in October, 1969, New Guinea was struck by a
strain of virus similar to the A2/Hong Kong which has appeared in
other parts of the world in 1968 and 1969. Although this virus only
caused mild epidemics in the rest of the world, (on the order of 15%),
the high susceptibility of the individuals occupying the inland areas
of New Guinea resulted in an extremely severe epidemic.
The virus was reportedly first spread in July at an annual
festival where thousands of mountain tribesmen gathered with people
from the coastal areas and people from overseas. In mod-October the
government officially reported the outbreak which had begun in earnest
in early October. Within one month, over 1.75 million of the 2.25
million population of New Guinea (78%) had been affected by the influ-
enza and cases were still being reported.
In this example, the population was very susceptible. We
could probably assume a minimum initial immunity level of 5% mainly
among people living on the coast who are more exposed to pathogens.
If we assume a removal rate of .5 we can see by referring back to
Table 5 that a contact rate of 1.1 to 1.5 would produce an attack rate
between 81% and 92% with an epidemic duration of 10 weeks to seven
weeks.
This method of determining the appropriate contact rate
based on observed data was used in an influenza model developed by
Elveback, et. al.. 45 This model assumes a highly structured popula-
tion with five different groups. A set of contact rates for these
groups was developed (not unique) that fit various data that were
collected from epidemics in 1957 and 1968.
The contact rates they used are not directly comparable to
the contact rate discussed here. However, their contact rates can
be adapted to reflect the same thing our contact rates do. When this is
done we find the following contact rates by group were used:
Preschooler 0.90
School child 3.18
Young adult 0.428
Older adult 0.303
Weighted average 1.347
5.5 Fitting the Model to a Particular Epidemic
In fitting a model, we should keep in mind that an epidemic
is completely defined by the initial immunes (RO), the contact rate (),
the removal rate (y) and the initial infectives (IO). The combination
of these four parameters will produce an epidemic with a particular
attack rate, duration and maximum infectives. In fact, the epidemic
curve which represents the new cases reported per day is completely
defined.
If we are attempting to specify a model to correspond to
a historic epidemic, we are trying to recreate a particular epidemic
curve. We might wish to do this to determine what we should have done
as far as vaccination programs in a past epidemic are concerned. It
is more likely, however, that we are more concerned with a future epi-
demic threat and feel there is a good chance that if an epidemic occurs,
it will resemble an epidemic in the past.
We find that the primary problem we face as we attempt to
do this is a lack of detailed data available from previous epidemics that
will allow us to specify our model.
This is partially a result of the fact that diagnosis of
influenza is not clearcut. In addition, notification of influenza cases
is not required in most states or countries.
We will attempt to fit the model while keeping these data
problems in mind. The problem as it has been stated is to determine
a combination of contact rate, removal rate and initial immunes that
produces the desired epidemic curve.
As an example, the epidemic that we will attempt to model is
the 1957 epidemic of Asian influenza in the United States. Specifically,
as there were two waves to this epidemic, one in late 1957 and one in
early 1958, we will model the first wave.
The epidemic of Asian influenza apparently began in central
China. The first epidemic occurred in Hong Kong in April, 1957 and
spread to Europe and the United States in May, 1957.
After the first outbreaks in southeast Asia, investigators
determined that the strain of virus that was responsible was related to
the type A virus. It was different, however, from strains that had
circulated previously.
The first U.S. outbreaks occurred in early June at a military
base in Rhode Island. By late June, outbreaks were reported in Califor-
nia and Iowa. This virus seemed to spread to the rest of the country
in September.46
From September 29 to November 27, 1957, a period of eight
weeks, about 70 million bed cases of influenza were estimated from a
U.S. National Health Survey. This survey noted a peak of 12 million
new cases during the week of October 13.47 Based on a U.S. population
estimate for July 1, 1957 of 171,000,000, the incidence in this eight
week period amounted to about 40%. The maximum new cases reported in
a week represented 7% of the population and 17% of the total incidence.
The following figure indicates that incidence occurring by
week from the beginning of October to the end of November as a percent
of the total incidence during this period according to various sources.
The various sources include county reports, industrial absenteeism
reports and the National Health Survey.
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FIGURE 13
Weekly Incidence of Influenza from Week Ending
October 5, 1957 to Week Ending November 30, 1957
(as a % of the Total Incidence of the Period)
Source: Langmuir, Alexander D., "Epidemiology
of Asian Influenza," American Review of Respira-
tory Diseases, vol. 83, no. 2, (Feb. 1961), p. 9.
The estimates of total incidence reported in a peak week
as a percent of total incidence range from 22% in county reports to
21% in industrial absenteeism reports to 17% in the National Health
Survey.
The following table indicates the approximate length of
time between the first isolations of a case in an area to the peak
of the epidemic in that area:
First Isolation
late June
June 24
August 6
TABLE 12
Epidemic Peak
August 5-11
October 13-18
October 4-11
The Spread of the 1957 Asian Influenza
Location
Louisiana
Cleveland
New York
The epidemic struck hardest among people less than 15 years
of age, primarily among those five to 15 where the level of incidence
was approximately 50%. There was much lower incidence among preschool
children. Incidence fell from age 15 on and was lowest in the over-65
age group.48
The vaccination program was undertaken in May. Within seven
months about 50 million doses were ready. However, only 4.6 million
of these were available by September 5, when the epidemic began. By
the first of November, when the epidemic peak had already passed,
42.6 million doses became available. 49
Figure 14 indicates the production experience in 1957. A
reasonable assumption is that there were not a significant number of
vaccinated individuals in the population when the epidemic was occurring.
I will assume it was less than two or three percent of the population.
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FIGURE 14
Asian Strain Influenza Vaccine Cleared for Release(millions of milliliters)
(From Murray, R,, p, 165)
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A study which gathered sera from persons of different ages
was conducted prior to the epidemic in the Netherlands. This study
showed antibodies to the Asian virus were present only in the elderly. 50
This led to a theory that the Asian virus had circulated previously
about the time of the 1850 pandemic.
From the information presented, we draw the following
conclusions that will be helpful in building the model:
1. Incidence was somewhat above 40%.
2. Peak week incidence of 7%, representing 17% of the
total incidence.
3. Duration of the epidemic about 12 weeks from early
September to early December.
4. Assume a small infective population present in early
September, 1957.
5. The peak incidence occurred about the middle of
October, or about six weeks after the initiali-
zation of the epidemic.
6. The vaccinated immune amounted to 3% of the popu-
lation.
7. The naturally immune, primarily elderly, accounted
for perhaps 10% of the population.
We will assume a removal rate of approximately .5. The
epidemic we want to model has an attack rate of about 40%, a peak in
daily new cases of about 1.5% and a duration of about 12 weeks or
84 days. Referring back to Table 5, we see that the following combi-
nations of the contact rate and the initial immunes are possible:
Initial Immunes Contact Rate Attack Rate/Max. New Cases
10% .75 43.2% / 1.7%
15% .80 41.5% / 1.7%
20% .87 41.3% / 1.9%
The epidemic curves corresponding to each of these combi-
nations are found in Figure 15. In addition, the output which details
the course of the epidemics on a day-to-day basis is also included.
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FIGURE 15
New Cases Reported (% of the Population) By Day of the Epidemic Using the Computer Model
with Removal Rate of .5, for Three Combinations of Contact Rate and Initial Immunes
That Produce Epidemics Resembling the 1957 Asian Epidemic
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This is found in Appendix C.
If we assume that the 10% initial immunes and contact rate of
.75 is correct, we can see from Table 5 that the immune population would
need to be raised to 33% to prevent the epidemic. The following table,
Table 13, outlines the new attack rates that would result from various
vaccination levels assuming an efficacy of the vaccine of 70%. The new
initial immunes is calculated from
Old immunes + Efficacy * (1- Old immunes) * %Vaccinated.100 100
% Vaccinated New Initial Immunes New Attack Rate
37% 33% 0
32 30 2%
24 25 16
16 20 26
8 15 34
0 10 43
TABLE 13
Attack Rates Resulting From Various Vaccination
Programs with Removal Rate of .5, Contact Rate
of .75, Initial Immunes of 10% and Efficacy of 70%.
Using the model presented in this thesis, and assuming
that a future epidemic resembled the 1957 Asian influenza epidemic,
a decision-make could apply a cost-benefit analysis to the vaccina-
tion-attack rate curve above to determine one or many acceptable or
optimal vaccination programs.
5.6 Comparison of the Model with Traditional Analysis
A more traditional approach to decision-making on
vaccination programs was presented by Schoenbaum, et. al. in "The
Swine Influenza Decision. 1151 The numbers that follow (the attack rate)
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are not the numbers that were used in the analysis. However, they will
suffice for an example.
We assume that the potential epidemic has been determined to
have an attack rate of 43.2%. According to the Schoenbaum analysis, if
you successfully vaccinate 16.8% of the population you prevent 7.26%
cases of influenza.
Using the model that we have presented here with an attack
rate of 43.2%, we might assume a contact rate of .75 and an initial
immune population of 10%. If we were able to successfully vaccinate
16.8% of the population, according to our analysis we would increase
the immune population to 25%, resulting in our model in an attack rate
of 16%. Therefore, the number of cases prevented amounted to approxi-
mately 27% of the population.
When using the Schoenbaum analysis, you will over-vaccinate
if your goal is a particular attack rate. If your goal is net benefits,
then with our model we show greater net benefits for a particular pro-
gram than the Schoenbaum analysis would show.
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Effects of Misspecification of Model
The attack rate as we have observed is a function of the
contact rate, the removal rate and size of the initial immune popula-
tion. In the process of applying the model, we find that once the
removal rate has been specified and we focus in on an epidemic with
a particular attack rate, we are faced with several possible combi-
nations of the contact rate and the initial immunes that will result
in the desired attack rate. This can be seen in Figure 16.
For example, for a removal rate of .5 and a base attack
rate of 36%, the combinations in which the contact rate is one and
the initial immunes are 30%, and the contact rate is 1.25 and the
initial immunes are 40% are both acceptable. We would like to know
the implications of basing a vaccination program on one choice of
parameters or the other. The epidemic curves of the two combinations
noted as well as two others producing attack rates of approximately
36% are shown in Figure 17.
We observe that, if we continue to hold the removal rate
constant, as above, the change in initial immunes required (through
a vaccination program) to reduce the attack rate from 36% to 18% is
approximately the same for all combinations of the contact rate and
initial immunes. For example, with a contact rate of 1 and initial
immunes of 30%, we need to increase the initial immunes to 40% to
achieve an attack rate of 18%. With a contact rate of 1.25 and
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initial immunes of 40%, we need to increase the initial immunes to
50% to achieve an attack rate of 18%. In both cases, the decision-
maker sees that if an attack rate of 18% is his target, he must
manage to immunize successfully an additional 10% of the population.
This argument implies that the marginal benefit in reduced
attack rate of increasing the number of initial immunes is the same
with all combinations of the contact rate and initial immunes that
produce a similar attack rate. In fact, we can calculate the marginal
benefit using the formula presented previously:
dAR 1 - eP/y-(-AR)
dR /y -O(-RO)I'S/y- (-AR) _ I
The results of deriving the marginal benefits of one
additional immune are presented below:
dARContact Rate Initial Immunes Attack Rate dR0
.75 .15 34.4% -1.8695
1.00 .30 36.6% -1.595
1.25 .40 36.0% -1.3819
TABLE 14
Change in Attack Rate for Change in Initial Immunes
at Attack Rates around 36%, for Various Contact
Rate and Initial Immunes Combinations
It is seen that the slopes of the lines in the attack rate
and initial immunes plane are not exactly equal for all contact rates.
However, for contact rates that are not extremely different the diffe-
rence in the slope is small. The line pertaining to the smallest
contact rate will have the highest marginal benefit holding the attack
rate constant.
The problem that arises from having to choose from among
various combinations of initial immunes and contact rate that produce
approximately the same epidemic is due to the different marginal costs
associated with achieving a particular increase in the immune level.
Returning to the example, we have determined that we must successfully
immunize 10% more of the population in order to lower the attack rate
from 36% to 18%. We can use the following formula to determine how
many individuals we must vaccinate to achieve this:
New R0 = R0 + (1-R0) (Efficacy) (Vaccinated)
and
Vaccinated = (New R0 ) - RO
(1-R0) (Efficacy)
Therefore with the contact rate of 1 and initial immunes of 30% we must
achieve a new initial immunes of 40%. If we assume a 70% efficacy for
the vaccine, then we must vaccinate 20% of the population.
With the contact rate of 1.25 and initial immunes of 40%
combination, we must achieve a new initial immunes of 50%. We must
vaccinate a total of 24% of the population.
So the implication of choosing one combination over another
is that in one case you will vaccinate 20% of the population and in the
other case you will vaccinate 24% of the population. One way of dea-
ling with this is to outline the results in terms of the eventual
attack rate achieved and program costs for different assumptions about
the correct values for the parameters.
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For example, in the example above we might be able to
narrow the contact rate down to between 1 and 1.25. We will now assume
that it lies in this range. As we showed above, given our target
attack rate of 18%, if the correct value of the contact rate is 1,
then we should vaccinate 20% of the population. If the correct value
of the contact rate is 1.25, then we should vaccinate 24% of the
population.
If the contact rate is really 1.25 and we assume that it is
1, we will only vaccinate 20% of the population and we will only
succeed in successfully immunizing an additional 8.4% of the population.
The resulting attack rate will be 21.7%--missing the target by 3.7%.
If the contact rate is really 1, and we assume that it is
1.25, we will vaccinate 24% of the population and we will succeed in
successfully immunizing an additional 11.76% of the population. The
attack rate will be reduced to 15.9%, overshooting the target by 2.1%.
The situation can be looked at as:
ASSUMPTION REALITY ATTACK RATE VACCINATED
3=1, R0=30% =l, R0=30% 18% 20%
S=l, R0=30% S=1.25, R0=40% 21.7% 20%
S=1.25, R0=40% S=1.25, R0=40% 18% 24%
=1.25, o=40% 3=1, R0=30% 15.9% 24%
TABLE 15
Effects of the Misspecification of Parameters
The more conservative strategy in terms of achieving the
attack rate target is to go with the 24% vaccination program, The more
conservative program in terms of program cost is the 20% vaccination
program.
6.2 Allowing for Multiple Groups in the Population
This model was originally developed based on the assumption
that we were dealing with the population as if it were one group. We
assume uniform mixing and we use one contact rate that is a weighted
average of all contact rates. We assume that there is uniform exposure
throughout the population.
It would be reasonable in a decision-making environment,
however, to want to present alternative courses of action that involve
specific groups in the population. For example, current annual influenza
immunization programs usually target only elderly individuals because
of their history of greater mortality and complications from influenza.
Historically, different age groups have had different attack
rates, as was discussed in Section 2. This may be due to differing
exposure opportunities or to differing levels of immunity. In any
event, it is reasonable at some point to want to take account of this
fact when analyzing various vaccination programs.
It is possible to achieve some reality in the model in
regard to this by allowing the various groups to have varying levels of
immunity. We still run the model assuming that the population is one
homogeneous group. However, the initial immunes is now a weighted
average of the initial immunes in the various groups. We calculate
the overall attack rate as we usually do in the model. We then deter-
mine what this attack rate is among the susceptibles (by dividing the
attack rate by the fraction of susceptibles in the population). We
apply the attack rate among susceptibles to the susceptibles in the
various age groups to determine the attack rate in the various groups.
This method of bringing the model to a multi-group stage
does not account for the differing contact rates among the various
groups. In fact, it assumes that the chance of exposure of a suscep-
tible is the same regardless of the group he is from. Allowing
different contact rates is a much more difficult problem that will not
be attempted here. An application that does use multiple contact rates
in a community setting is contained in Elveback, et. al., 1976.
APPENDIX A
I. The Average Length of the Time Infective is 1/y.
The average length of time an individual is infective may
be found by multiplying the new immunes each day by the number of days
they were sick, and dividing by the number of original infectives, over
all time from t = 0 to t = o. Letting 10 represent the original infective
population we have:
t
t Oy(1-T) (t-1)Average Length of Infective Period =
10
t=o 
t-1
= y7 t (1-y)
t=0
t=oo
We now let t (1-y)
t=0
dv
dy
n=oo
where = (1-Y)
n=O
We know that X n and as n
(1-y)- 1
Therefore - dX 2
y
+ a, X0, =
We can then conclude that y
t=o
t (1-y)
t=0
1/y
t-1
= 
1 /y
tel
II. To Calculate dAR (or the slope of the lines in Figures 3 and 4)
dR
0
Let f = S0 ' e (/y).(SC*+ R0 1) - S = 0
(=/y)e(Sw+ R 1
- e RO (/y) *(So+ RO 
-
1
R0 e
Let p = y
Then,
df =
DS
dS0 + dRDRO0
+ dp 0
(-Df/ DRO) 
- (Df/Dp)-(dp/dR0
qf/;SC,
We can determine
dR
0
Ss0
dS00
dR 0
Therefore,
S0' (SO+R 0 p (S +R
0  
- 1)
0
p (S +R -1)
e 0 0 -(p -p-R0 - 1)
p. (S +R0 - 1)
- p-RO'
p. (Soo+ R0 - 1)
(p-p-R 0 - 1)-E
(p-pRO p.(S +R -
1)
- 1
-S=
dS
dR 
0
- 1
To clcuate dARTo calculate, we observe that AR = So - So and S + RO0
Therefore S, = S -AR
dAR dSO dS = dSC
dR
0 dRO dR 0dRO
Finally,
dAR
dR0
p. (-AR)
1- e
p -1AR-
Pe (1-R 0),e -1
An analysis of Figure 3 shows that dAR at a given level
0
of attack rate is approximately the same for different values of the
contact rate parameter, especially when there is not a great difference
between the values.
APPENDIX B
I. The APL Programs
V EPISTATS--GUPTA PARAMETERS;SUS1;SUS2;DELSUS;INF1 ;INF2;D
ELINF;IMM1 ;IMM2;DELIMM;BETA;GAMMA;DAY;MATRIX;ATRATE;SA
TRATE;MAXINF
[1] INITIALIZE:SUS1-1-((PARAMETERS[1]PARAMETERS[2])+100)
[2] INF1-+PARAMETERS[1]+100
[3] IMM1-PARAMETERS[2]+100
[4] BETA+PARAMETERS[ 3]
[5] GAMMA +PARAMETERS[4]
[6] EPISTATS+8p0
[7] DAY-DELSUS+DELINF-DELIMM+O
(8] MATRIX+-DAY,SUS1,INF1,IMM1,DELSUS,DELINF,DELIMM
[9] LOOP:SUS2+((SUS1-BETAxSUS1xINF1) o)x(SUS1-BETAxSUS1xINF1)
[10] DELSUS+SUS2-SUS1
[11] INF2+(INF1-DELSUS)-GAMMAxINF1
[12] DELINF-INF2-INF1
[13] IMM2-+-IMM1+GAMMAxINF1
[14] DELIMM+-IMM2 -IMM1
[15] DAY+DAY+1
[16] MATRIX-MATRIX,DAY,SUS2,INF2,IMM2,DELSUS,DELINF,DELIMM
[17] +(((INF25MATRIX[33)A(DELINF0))V(DAY>360))/END
[18] SUS1-+-SUS2
[19] INF1+INF2
[20] IMM1+IMM2
[21] +LOOP
[22] END:EPIDEMIC+(((PMATRIX)+7),7)pMATRIX
[23] EPIDEMIC[;1+16]+EPIDEMICE;1+16]x100
[24] MAXINF+EPIDEMIC[(tEPIDEMIC;33)[pEPIDEMICE;3]];3]
[25] ATRATE-EPIDEMIC[(DAY+1);4]-PARAMETERS[2]
[26] SATRATE+-ATRATE+(1-(PARAMETERS[ 2]+100))
[27] EPISTATS+PARAMETERS,ATRATE,SATRATE,DAY,MAXINF
V
This is the central epidemic program for an exponentially distributed
infective period.
V PRINTEP EPIDEMIC;INDEX
i] ---PERCENT OF THE POPULATION----- ------ CHANGE
IN---------
[2] ' DAY SUSCEPTIBLES INFECTIVES IMMUNES SUSCEPT INFE
CT IMMUNES'
[3] INDEX+1
[4] LOOP:(4 0 12 5 12 5 12 5 9 5 8 5 9 5)vEPIDEMIC[INDEX;]
[5] -((INDEX+INDEX+1)(1+pEPIDEMIC))/LOOP
[6] +0
v
This program is used to print the course of the epidemic table,
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V EPISTATS+GUPTA PARAMETERS;SUS1 ;SUS2 ;DELSUS;INF1;INF2 ;D
ELINF;IMM1 ;IMM2 ;DELIMM ;BETA ;GAMMA ;DAY;MATRIX; ATRATE; SA
TRATE;MAXINF;NEWINF
[1] INITIALIZE:SUS1+-1-((PARAMETERS[1]+PARAMETERS[2])+100)
E2] INF1-PARAMETERSE1 ] +100
[3] IMM1+-PARAMETERS[2] +100
[4] BETA-PARAMETERS[ 3]
E5] GAMMA -PARAMETERSE 4 ]
[6] EPISTATS+8p0
[7] DAY(-DELIMM+0
[8] NEWINF-GAMMAP (INF1+ GAMMA)
E9] DELINF-4-NEWINF[ GAMMA ]
[10] DELSUS+-DELINF
[11] MATRIX-+-DAY,SUS1,INF1,IMM1 ,DELSUS,DELINF,DELIMM
[12] LOOP:SUS2--((SUS1-BETAxSUS1xINF1)>0 )x(SUS1-BETAxSUS1xINF1)
[13] DELSUS-SUS2-SUS1
E114] INF2+(INF1-DELSUS) -NEWINFE (pNEWINF )+1-GAMMA 3[15] DELINF+INF2-INF1
[16] IMM2+-IMM1+NEWINF[ (pNEWINF)+ 1-GAMMA]
[17] DELIMM*-IMM2-IMM1
[18] NEWINF+-NEWINF , (-DELSUS)
[19] DAY-DAY+1
[20] MATRIX-MATRIX,DAY,SUS2 ,INF2 ,IMM2 ,DELSUSDELINF,DELIMM
[21] + (((INF25MATRIXE3])A(DELINFo ) )v(DAY>360) )/END
[22] SUS1+SUS2
[23] INF1-INF2
[24] IMM1-IMM2
E251 +LOOP
[26] END:EPIDEMIC+( ((pMATRIX)?7),7)pMATRIX
[27] EPIDEMIC[;1+16 ]+EPIDEMIC[;1+i6]xlOO
[28] MAXINF+-EPIDEMICE(kEPIDEMIC[;3])[pEPIDEMIC[ ;3]];33
[29] ATRATE-EPIDEMICE(DAY+1);4]-PARAMETERS[2]
[30] SATRAT E+ATRATE+(1-(PARAMETERS[ 2 1]100))
[31] EPISTATS+PARAMETERS,ATRATESATRATE,DAY,MAXINF
V
This is the central epidemic simulation program for an infective period
of constant length,
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V SENSGUPTA BASE;X;VALUES;CASE;INDEX;SENS
[1] 'PLEASE INPUT THE NUMBER OF THE PARAMETER YOU WISH TO SE
NSITIZE'
[21 '1. INITIAL INFECTIVES'
[31 '2. INITIAL IMMUNES
[4] '3. BETA'
[51 '4. GAMMA'
[61 X4-f
[71 'CURRENT VALUE IS ',TBASEEX]
[81 'PLEASE INPUT THE VALUES FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS'
[91 VALUES+I1
[10] SENS+( (pVALUES),8)pO
[11] INDEX-1
[12] VALUES--VALUES[$VALUES]
E131 CASE-BASE
[14] LOOP:CASu[X]+VALUES[INDEX3
[151 SENSEINDEX;]-GUPTA CASE
[16] INDEX+INDEX+1
[171 -(INDEX (p VALUES) )/LOOP
[18] HEADING
[19] PRINT1 SENS
V
This program is used to do sensitivity analysis on any of the four
model parameters: the initial infectives, the initial immunes, the
contact rate or the removal rate,
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V HEADING
E1] t INITIAL INITIAL CASES REPORTED
REPORTED MAX'
[2] 'INFECTIVES IMMUNES BETA GAMMA PCT POPULATION
SCEPT DAYS INF'
v
Il]
[2]
13]
14]
V PRINT1 SENS;INDEX
INDEX-1
LOOP:(7 6 8 0 8 2 5 2 12 4 17 4 7 0 8 3)VSENS[INDEX;]
INDEX*-INDEX+1
+(INDEX (1+pSENS) )/LOOP
These programs are used to print the results of the central epidemic
simulation program.
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CASES
PCT SU
V OUTPUT+PROGRAM EPICON DISEASE;DEATHRT;BETA;GAMMA;POP;T
ARGET;ACCEPT;EFF;SIDE;PARAMETERS;BASERATE;PROGRATE;EPI
STATS ;INITINF ; INIMPOP ;INIMGP
[1] OUTPUT-(17 7)pO
[21 DEATHRT+i-DISEASE[1;]+100
[3] BETA +DISEASE[2;1]
[4] GAMMA +-DISEASE[ 3; 1]
[5] POP+PROGRAM[1;3+100
E61 TARGET-PROGRAM[ 2;] +100
[7] ACCEPT+PROGRAME3;]+100
[8] EFF--PROGRAM[4;]+100
[9] SIDE-PROGRAM[5;]+100
[10] INITINF-PROGRAM[ 6 ;1]
[11] INIMGP-PROGRAM[7 ;]+100
[12] INIMPOP+POPxINIMGP
[13] PARAMETERS+INITINF,( 100x(+/INIMPOP ) ),BETA,GAMMA
[14] HEADING
[15] EPISTATS+GUPTA PARAMETERS
[16] BASERATE+-EPISTATS[ 5]
[171 PRINT1(1 8)pEPISTATS
[18] PARAMETERS[2]+*100x(+/INIMPOP)+((1-(+/INIMPOP))x(+/POPx
TARGETxACCEPTxEFF))
[19] EPISTATS-GUPTA PARAMETERS
[20] PROGRATE-EPISTATS[5]
[21] PRINT1(1 7)pEPISTATS
[22] '
E23] OUTPUTE7;]+PROGRAM
[24] OUTPUT[7+i3;]-DISEASE
[25] OUTPUT[11;-+TARGETx100
[26] OUTPUT[12;]-TARGETxACCEPTx100
E 27 ] OUTPUT[ 13; 3+<(BASERATE+( 1-(+/INIMPOP) ))x (1-INIMGP)x (POP 0
)
[28] OUTPUT[14;]-(POP 0)x(PROGRATE+(1-( (+g/INIMPOP)+((1-(+/
INIMPOP))x(+/POPxTARGETxACCEPTxEFF)))))x(1-(INIMGP+((1-
INIMGP)x(TARGETxACCEPTxEFF))))
[29] OUTPUT[15;]+-OUTPUT[13;]xDEATHRT
[30] OUTPUT[16;3-OUTPUT[14;]xDEATHRT
[31] OUTPUT[17;-OUTPUT[12;]xSIDE
V
This program allows the analysis of a group-based vaccination program
against the "base case" (no vaccination program), It assumes only
one contact rate however different immunity levels are allowed for
the different groups. This program was used by Andrew Gralla and
Charles Smart in a decision support system which they designed to
perform cost/benefit analyses on different vaccination programs,
104
V RESULTS+-PROGRAM SENSIT DISEASE;Y;VALUES;COUNT;WAIT;PRO
DIS
El] PRODIS-PROGRAM,[1] DISEASE
E2] 'WHICH PARAMETER DO YOU WANT TO SENSITIZE?'
[31 '1. PCT OF POPULATION'
[4] '2. TARGETED'
[5] '3. ACCEPTANCE RATE'
E6] '4. EFFICACY RATE'
[7] '5. SIDE EFFECT RATE (PCT OF VACCINATED)'
[8] '6. INITIAL INFECTIVES'
[91 '7. INITIAL IMMUNES'
(10] '8. DEATH RATE'
[111 '9. BETA'
[121 '10. GAMMA'
[131 PARAM:Y +U
[141 -(YE1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)/JUMP
[151 'INPUT EITHER 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 OR 10'
(161 +PARAM
[171 JUMP:'CURRENT VALUE IS ',VPRODIS[Y;]
(181 INPUT:VALUES-PRODISEY;],E1] BUILD
[19] 'RESET PAGE AND HIT CARRIAGE RETURN'
[20] WAIT+-M
E21] INIT:COUNT+1
[22] RESULTS+((1+p VALUES),17,7)p0
E231 RUN:PRODISEY;]+VALUESECOUNT;]
[241 RESULTSE COUNT; ;1 ]+PRODISE 17; ] EPICON PRODISE8 9 10 ;3
E251 COUNT+COUNT+1
[26] +(COUNT (1+pVALUES))/RUN
E271 +0
V
This program allows a sensitivity analysis of the parameters that
go into the analysis of group-based vaccination programs,
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V VALUES-BUILD;INDEX;VALUES;VALUE
(l] 'PLEASE INPUT NEW CASES LINE BY LINE'
[2] 'TYPE 0 TO STOP'
[3] INDEX+1
[4] VALUES+-i0
[5] ASSIGN:'CASE ',Y(INDEX+1)
[6] VALUE-4
[7] +((pVALUE)=>)/CONT
[8] -+(VALUE=0) /ENDIN
[9] 'TYPE 0 TO END INPUT OR INPUT CASE AGAIN.'
[10] -ASSIGN
[11] CONT:INDEX-INDEX+1
[12] VALUES+VALUES, VALUE
[13] -ASSIGN
[14] ENDIN:VALUES+( ( (pVALUES)?7 ),7 )p VALUES
V
This program is used by the previous sensitivity analysis program,
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V PRINTOUT RESULTS;WAIT;INDEX
-+-((ppRESULTS)=3)/THREE
RESULTS[17;] PRINT2 RESULTS[7+13;]
it
PRINT RESULTS[10+17;]
*i
'HIT RETURN'
WAIT+9
+0
THREE:INDEX+1
LOOP: 'CASE ',vINDEX
RESULTS[INDEX; 17;] PRINT2
''
RESULTSEINDEX;7+i3;]
[1]
2]
[3]
[1]
[5]E 53[6]
E7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
E13]
[14]
[15]
E16]
[17]
This program prints the results of the group-based vaccination program
analysis.
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PRINT RESULTSEINDEX;10+i7;]
''
'HIT RETURN'
WAIT+']
+((INDEX+IINDEX+1) (1+pRESULTS))/LOOP
V
V PRINT OUTP
'THE OUTPUT FILE FROM EPICON'
'G
'GROUP 1 GROUP2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUPS G
ROUP6 GROUP7'
'TARGETED ',(7
'VACCINATED 1,7
'INFECTED (BASE) ',(7
'INFECTED (PROGRAM)',(7
'DEAD (BASE) ',(7
'DEAD (PROGRAM) 1,(7
'SIDE EFFECTS 1,(7
'NOTE:THE NUMBERS ABOVE
E GROUPS'
V
1)VOUTP[
1),OUTP[
3)VOUTPE
3)vOUTPE
4) vOUTPE
4)VOUTP[
4)VOUTP[
REFLECT
1;]
2;]
3;]
4;]
5;]
6;]
7;]
PERCENTAGES
[1]
[23]
E3]
[4]
E5]
E6]
E7]
E8]
[9]
[10
[11
V PROGRAM PRINT2
I'
DISEASE
'PROGRAM AND DISEASE PARAMETERS'
I GROUP1 GROUP2
ROUP6 GROUP7'
'PCT OF POPULATION
'TARGETED
'ACCEPTANCE RATE
'EFFICACY RATE
'SIDE EFFECT RATE
'INITIAL INFECTIVES
'INITIAL IMMUNES
'DEATH RATE
'BETA
'GAMMA
'NUMBERS REFLECT PE
)vPROGRAM[1
)YPROGRAM[2
)vPROGRAM[3
)VPROGRAM[4
)VPROGRAM[ 5
)VPROGRAM[6
)VPROGRAM[7
)VDISEASE[1
) DISEASE[2
)vDISEASE[3
RCENTAGES,
GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS G
EXCEPT FOR BETA AND GAMMA'
These programs support the previous print program for the group-based
vaccination program analysis,
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OF RESPECTIV
E1]
E2]
E3]
[]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
E10]
[11]
[12]
E13]
[14
II, Examples from the Interactive Computer Model Programs
GUPTA .00001 30 .8 .5
0.00001 30 0.8 0.5
GUPTA .00001
0.00001 25 0.8 0.5
14.57332232
25 .8 .5
23.86111167
20.81903188
31.81481556
361 0.4249219809
274 1.139038278
GUPTA .00001 15 .8 .5
0.00001 15 0.8 0.5 41.54624696 48.8779376 171 3.455572723
GUPTA .00001
0.00001 10 0.8 0.5
10 .8 .5
49.99728933 55.5525437 146 5.010940075
Note: Those commands that are input by the user are underlined,
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SENSGUPTA .00001 30 .8 .5
PLEASE INPUT THE NUMBER OF THE PARAMETER YOU WISH TO SENSITIZE
1. INITIAL INFECTIVES
2. INITIAL IMMUNES
3. BETA
4. GAMMA
0:
CURRENT VALUE IS 30
PLEASE INPUT THE VALUES FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
0:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
INITIAL INITIAL CASES REPORTED
INFECTIVES IMMUNES BETA GAMMA PCT POPULATION
.000010 0 .80 .50 66.2201
.000010 5 .80 .50 58.2159
.000010 10 .80 .50 49.9973
.000010 15 .80 .50 41.5462
.000010 20 .80 .50 32.8422
.000010
.000010
.000010
25 .80 .50
30 .80 .50
35 .80 .50
23.8611
14.5733
.2989
CASES REPORT
PCT SUSCEPT
66.2201
61.2799
55.5525
48.8779
41.0527
31.8148
20.8190
.4598
ED MAX
DAYS INF
115 8.794
129 6.801
146 5.011
171 3.456
209 2.159
274 1.139
361
361
.425
.011
PROG
1.9 7.4 4.6 10.7 24.4 35.3 15.7
0 100 100 100 0 100 100
0 65 60 65 0 65 60
0 70 70 70 0 70 70
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DISEA
0.0006 0.0004 0.0019 0.0087 0.0006 0.0004 0.0019
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
These are the two data files that are used in the group-based
vaccination program analysis. The first file (PROG) defines
(1) percent of population in each group (2) the percent of each
group that is targeted by the vaccination program (3) the acceptance
rate of each group (4) the efficacy of the vaccine by group (5) the
side effect rate by group (6) the initial infectives (not broken
down by group) and (7) the initial immunes by group, The second
data file (DISEA) defines (1) the death rate by group (2) a contact
rate and (3) a removal rate. These last two are not group specific,
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RESULTS+PROG EPICON DISEA
INITIAL INITIAL CASES REPORTED
INFECTIVES IMMUNES BETA GAMMA PCT POPULATION
.010000 0 .80 .50 66.2129
33 .80 .50 9.1734
PROGRAM AND DISEASE PARAMETERS
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3
PCT OF POPULATION 1.9 7.4 4.6
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0
ACCEPTANCE RATE .0 65.0 60.0
EFFICACY RATE .0 70.0 70.0
SIDE EFFECT RATE .0000 .0000 .0000
INITIAL INFECTIVES .0100 .0100 .0100
INITIAL IMMUNES .0 .0 .0
DEATH RATE .0006 .0004 .0019
BETA .8 .8 .8
GAMMA .5 .5 .5
NUMBERS REFLECT PERCENTAGES, EXCEPT FOR
GROUP4
10.7
100.0
65.0
70.0
.0000
.0100
.0
.0087
.8
.5
GROUP5
24.4
.0
.0
.0
.0000
.0100
.0
.0006
.8
.5
BETA AND GAMMA
THE OUTPUT FILE FROM EPICON
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5 GROUP6 GROUP7
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0
VACCINATED .0 65.0 60.0
INFECTED (BASE) 66.213 66.213 66.213
INFECTED (PROGRAM) 13.656 7.442 7.920
DEAD (BASE) .0004 .0003 .0013
DEAD (PROGRAM) .0001 .0000 .0002
SIDE EFFECTS .0000 .0000 .0000
100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
66.213 66.213 66.213 66.213
7.442 13.656 7.442 7.920
.0058 .0004 .0003 .0013
.0006 .0001 .0000 .0002
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
NOTE:THE NUMBERS ABOVE REFLECT PERCENTAGES OF RESPECTIVE GROUPS
HIT RETURN
.010000
PRINTOUT RESULTS
CASES REPORTED
PCT SUSCEPT DAYS
66.2129 63
13.6555 225
MAX
INF
8.816
.178
GROUP6
35.3
100.0
65.0
70.0
.0000
.0100
.0
.0004
.8
.5
GROUP7
15.7
100.0
60.0
70.0
.0000
.0100
.0
.0019
.8
.5
RESULTS+PROG SENSIT DISEA
WHICH PARAMETER DO YOU WANT TO SENSITIZE?
1. PCT OF POPULATION
2. TARGETED
3. ACCEPTANCE RATE
4 . EFFICACY RATE
5. SIDE EFFECT RATE (PCT OF VACCINATED)
6. INITIAL INFECTIVES
7. INITIAL IMMUNES
8. DEATH RATE
9. BETA
10. GAMMA
0:
CURRENT VALUE IS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PLEASE INPUT NEW CASES LINE BY LINE
TYPE 0 TO STOP
CASE 2
0:
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
CASE 3
0:
0 0 25 50 0 0 25
CASE 4
0:
0
RESET PXGE AND HIT CARRIAGE RETURN
INITIAL INITIAL
INFECTIVES IMMUNES BETA GAMMA
.010000 0 .80 .50
.010000 33 .80 .50
INITIAL INITIAL
INFECTIVES IMMU5ES BETA GAMMA
.010000 10 .80 .50
.010000 40 .80 .50
INITIAL INITIAL
INFECTIVES IMMU5ES BETA GAMMA
.010000 10 .80 .50
40 .80 .50
CASES REPORTED
PCT POPULATION
66.2129
9.1734
CASES REPORTED
PCT POPULATION
49.9886
.0050
CASES REPORTED
PCT POPULATION
49.2805
.0050
CASES REPORTED
PCT SUSCEPT DAYS
66.2129 63
13.6555 225
MAX
INF
8.816
.178
CASES REPORTED MAX
PCT SUSCEPT DAYS INF
55.5429 77 5.019
.0083 1 .010
CASES REPORTED MAX
PCT SUSCEPT DAYS INF
55.0159 78 4.867
.0083 1 .010.010000
PRINTOUT RESULTS
CASE 1
PROGRAM AND DISEASE PARAMETERS
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP GROUP5 GROUP6 GROUP7
PCT OF POPULATION 1.9 7.4 4.6 10.7 24.4 35.3 15.7
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
ACCEPTANCE RATE .0 65.0 60.0 65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
EFFICACY RATE .0 70.0 70.0 70.0 .0 70.0 70.0
SIDE EFFECT RATE .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
INITIAL INFECTIVES .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100
INITIAL IMMUNES .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
DEATH RATE .0006 .0004 .0019 .0087 .0006 .0004 .0019
BETA .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8
GAMMA .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
NUMBERS REFLECT PERCENTAGES, EXCEPT FOR BETA AND GAMM4A
_THE OUTPUT FILE FROM EPICON
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS GROUP6 GROUP7
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
VACCINATED .0 65.0 60.0 65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
INFECTED (BASE) 66.213 66.213 66.213 66.213 66.213 66.213 66.213
INFECTED (PROGRAM) 13.656 7.442 7.920 7.442 13.656 7.442 7.920
DEAD (BASE) .0004 .0003 .0013 .0058 .0004 .0003 .0013
DEAD (PROGRAM) .0001 .0000 .0002 .0006 .0001 .0000 .0002
SIDE EFFECTS .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
NOTE:THE NUMBERS ABOVE REFLECT PERCENTAGES OF RESPECTIVE GROUPS
HIT RETURN
CASE 2
PROGRAM AND DISEASE PARAMETERS
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5 GROUP6 GROUP7
PCT OF POPULATION 1.9 7.4 4.6 10.7 24.4 35.3 15.7
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
ACCEPTANCE RATE .0 65.0 60.0 65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
EFFICACY RATE .0 70.0 70.0 70.0 .0 70.0 70.0
SIDE EFFECT RATE .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
INITIAL INFECTIVES .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100 .0100
INITIAL IMMUNES 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
DEATH RATE .0006 .0004 .0019 .0087 .0006 .0004 .0019
BETA .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8
GAMMA .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
NUMBERS REFLECT PERCENTAGES, EXCEPT FOR BETA AND GAMMA
-. THE OUTPUT FILE FROM EPICON
on
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5 GROUP6 GROUP7
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
VACCINATED .0 65.0 60.0 65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
INFECTED (BASE) 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989
INFECTED (PROGRAM) .007 .004 .004 .004 .007 .004 .004
DEAD (BASE) .0003 .0002 .0009 .0043 .0003 .0002 .0009
DEAD (PROGRAM) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
SIDE EFFECTS .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
NOTE:THE NUMBERS ABOVE REFLECT PERCENTAGES OF RESPECTIVE GROUPS
HIT RETURN
CASE 3
PROGRAM AND DISEASE PARAMETERS
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3
PCT OF POPULATION 1.9 7.4 4.6
TARGETED .0 100.0 100.0
ACCEPTANCE RATE .0 65.0 60.0
EFFICACY RATE .0 70.0 70.0
SIDE EFFECT RATE .0000 .0000 .0000
INITIAL INFECTIVES .0100 .0100 .0100
INITIAL IMMUSES .0 .0 25.0
DEATH RATE .0006 .0004 .0019
BETA .8 .8 .8
GAMMA .5 .5 .5
NUMBERS REFLECT PERCENTAGES, EXCEPT FOR
GROUP4 GROUP5 GROUP6
10.7 24.4 35.3
100.0 .0 100.0
65.0 .0 65.0
70.0 .0 70.0
.0000 .0000 .0000
.0100 .0100 .0100
50.0
.0087
.0 .0
.0006 .0004
.8 .8
.5 .5
BETA AND GAMMA
GROUP7
15.7
100.0
60.0
70.0
.0000
.0100
25.0
.0019
.8
.5
THE OUTPUT FILE FROM EPICON
TARGETED
VACCINATED
INFECTED (BASE)
INFECTED (PROGRAM)
DEAD (BASE)
DEAD (PROGRAM)
SIDE EFFECTS
GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3
.0 100.0 100.0
.0 65.0 60.0
55.016 55.016 41.262
.008 .005 .004
.0003 .0002 .0008
.0000 .0000 .0000
.0000 .0000 .0000
GROUP4 GROUP5 GROUP6 GROUP7
100.0 .0 100.0 100.0
65.0 .0 65.0 60.0
27.508 55.016 55.016 41.262
.002 .008 .005 .004
.0024 .0003 .0002 .0008
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
NOTE:THE NUMBERS ABOVE REFLECT PERCENTAGES OF RESPECTIVE GROUPS
HIT RETURN
APPENDIX C
The course of the epidemic with Contact rate of ,75, removal rate of .5,
initial immunes of 10% and initial infectives of .00001%.
DAY
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
THE POPULATION--------PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
89.99999
89.99998
89.99998
89.99997
89.99996
89.99994
89.99993
89.99991
89.99989
89.99986
89.99984
89.99980
89.99976
89.99971
89.99966
89.99960
89.99952
89.99943
89.99933
89.99920
89.99906
89.99889
89.99869
89.99845
89.99818
89.99785
89.99747
89.99703
89.99650
89.99589
89.99516
89.99431
89.99331
89.99213
89.99075
89.98913
89.98722
89.98498
89.98235
89.97925
89.97562
89.97135
89.96634
89.96044
89.95352
INFECTIVES
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00011
.00013
.00016
.00018
.00021
.00025
.00030
.00035
.00041
.00048
.00056
.00066
.00078
.00091
.00107
.00126
.00148
.00174
.00205
.00241
.00283
.00332
.00390
.00458
.00538
.00633
.00743
.00873
.01026
.01205
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES
10.00000
10.00000
10.00001
10.00002
10.00003
10.00004
10.00005
10.00006
10.00008
10.00009
10.00011
10.00014
10.00017
10.00020
10.00024
10.00029
10.00035
10.00041
10.00049
10.00058
10.00069
10.00082
10.00096
10.00114
10.00134
10.00158
10.00186
10.00219
10.00258
10.00304
10.00358
10.00421
10.00495
10.00582
10.00684
10.00805
10.00946
10.01112
10.01307
10.01536
10.01805
10.02122
10.02493
10.02930
10.03443
SUSCEPT
.00000
~.00001
.00001
.00001
~.00001
.00001
.00002
~00002
~.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
00005
00005
00006
.00008
~00009
.00010
.00012
.00014
00017
.00020
.00023
.00028
.00032
~.00038
.00045
.00053
.00062
.00072
.00085
.00100
.00118
.00138
.00162
.00191
.00224
.00263
.00309
.00363
.00427
.00501
.00589
.00692
INFECT
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00012
.00014
.00016
.00019
.00022
.00026
.00030
.00036
.00042
.00049
.00058
.00068
.00080
.00094
.00111
.00130
.00153
.00179
118
IMMUNES
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00009
.00011
.00013
.00015
.00017
.00020
.00024
.00028
.00033
.00039
.00046
.00054
.00063
.00074
.00087
.00102
.00120
.00141
.00166
.00195
.00229
.00269
.00316
.00372
.00437
.00513
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
DAY
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
SUSCEPTIBLES
89.94540
89.93585
89.92464
89.91147
89.89600
89.87785
89.85653
89.83152
89.80215
89.76770
89.72729
89.67989
89.62433
89.55921
89.48294
89.39366
89.28919
89.16707
89.02442
88.85796
88.66395
88.43815
88.17577
87.87144
87.51925
87.11268
86.64470
86.10787
85.49442
84.79654
84.00661
83.11762
82.12366
81.02041
79.80581
78.48062
77.04901
75.51898
73.90257
72.21573
70.47794
68.71138
66.93988
65.18758
63.47765
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
.01415
.01662
.01952
.02293
.02693
.03162
.03712
.04358
.05115
.06003
.07043
.08261
.09687
.11355
.13304
.15581
.18237
.21331
.24931
.29111
.33956
.39558
.46018
.53441
.61940
.71627
.82611
.94989
1.08839
1.24208
1.41097
1.59447
1.79120
1.99885
2.21403
2.43221
2.64771
2.85388
3.04336
3.20852
3.34205
3.43758
3.49030
3.49745
3.45865
10.04045
10.04753
10.05584
10.06560
10.07707
10.09053
10.10634
10.12490
10.14669
10.17227
10.20229
10.23750
10.27880
10.32724
10.38401
10.45053
10.52844
10.61962
10.72628
10.85093
10.99649
11.16627
11.36406
11.59415
11.86135
12.17105
12.52919
12.94224
13.41719
13.96138
14.58242
15.28791
16.08514
16.98074
17.98016
19.08718
20.30328
21.62713
23.05407
24.57575
26.18001
27.85104
29.56983
31.31498
33.06370
INFECT IMMUNES
.00813
.00955
.01121
.01317
.01546
.01816
.02131
.02502
~ 02936
.03445
.04041
.04740
.05556
.06511
.07627
.08929
.10446
.12213
.14265
.16646
.19401
.22580
.26238
.30432
.35220
.40657
.46797
.53683
.61345
.69789
.78993
.88898
.99396
1.10325
1.21460
1.32519
1.43161
1.53003
1.61642
1.68684
1.73779
1.76656
1.77151
1.75230
1.70993
.00210
.00247
.00290
.00341
.00400
.00469
.00550
.00646
.00757
.00888
.01040
.01218
.01426
.01668
.01950
.02277
.02656
.03094
.03600
.04180
.04845
.05602
.06459
.07423
.08499
.09687
.10984
.12378
.13850
.15369
.16889
.18350
.19673
.20765
.21518
.21818
.21550
.20617
.18948
.16516
.13353
.09553
.05272
.00715
.03880 1.74872
119
.00602
.00708
.00831
.00976
.01147
.01346
.01581
.01856
.02179
.02558
.03001
.03521
.04131
.04843
.05677
.06652
.07790
.09118
.10665
.12465
.14556
.16978
.19779
.23009
.26721
.30970
.35814
.41305
.47494
.54420
.62104
.70549
.79723
.89560
.99942
1.10701
1.21610
1.32386
1.42694
1.52168
1.60426
1.67102
1.71879
1.74515
------ CHANGE IN ---------
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
------ CHANGE IN---------
--- PERCENT OF
DAY SUSCEPTIBLES
61.83105
60.26552
58.79497
57.42917
56.17387
55.03107
53.99963
53.07584
52.25412
51.52758
50.88858
50.32917
49.84137
49.41749
49.05026
48.73290
48.45926
48.22376
48.02140
47.84776
47.69895
47.57153
47.46254
47.36937
47.28977
47.22181
47.16381
47.11433
47.07213
47.03615
47.00548
46.97934
46.95707
46.93810
46.92194
46.90817
46.89645
46.88647
46.87796
46.87073
46.86456
46.85931
46.85485
46.85104
46.84780
INFECTIVES
3.37593
3.25349
3.09730
2.91444
2.71252
2.49906
2.28097
2.06428
1.85386
1.65347
1.46573
1.29228
1.13394
.99085
.86266
.74868
.64798
.55950
.48211
.41469
.35616
.30549
.26174
.22404
.19162
.16377
.13989
.11943
.10191
.08694
.07414
.06320
.05387
.04591
.03912
.03332
.02838
.02418
.02059
.01753
.01493
.01271
.01082
.00922
.00785
INFECT IMMUNESIMMUNES
34.79303
36.48099
38.10774
39.65639
41.11361
42.46987
43.71940
44.85988
45.89202
46.81895
47.64569
48.37855
49.02469
49.59166
50.08708
50.51841
50.89276
51.21675
51.49650
51.73755
51.94489
52.12297
52.27572
52.40659
52.51861
52.61442
52.69631
52.76625
52.82596
52.87692
52.92039
52.95745
52.98906
53.01599
53.03895
53.05850
53.07517
53.08936
53.10145
53.11174
53.12051
53.12797
53.13433
53.13974
53.14435
SUSCEPT
1.64660
1.56553
1.47055
1.36579
1.25530
1.14280
1.03144
.92379
.82172
.72654
.63899
.55942
.48780
.42388
.36724
.31735
.27364
.23551
.20236
.17364
.14881
.12741
.10900
.09317
.07960
.06796
.05800
.04948
.04220
.03598
.03067
.02614
.02227
.01897
.01616
. 01377
.01172
.00998
.00850
.00724
.00616
.00525
.00447
.00380
.00324
120
.08272
.12244
.15620
.18286
.20192
.21346
.21809
.21670
.21041
.20039
.18774
.17345
.15834
.14309
.12818
.11398
.10070
.08849
.07739
.06742
.05853
.05067
.04375
003770
~.03243
.02785
.02388
.02046
.01751
.01498
~ 01280
.01093
.00933
.00796
.00679
000579
.00494
.00421
.00359
.00306
.00260
.00222
.00189
.00161
.00137
1.72933
1.68796
1.62675
1.54865
1.45722
1.35626
1.24953
1.14049
1.03214
.92693
.82673
.73286
.64614
.56697
.49542
.43133
.37434
.32399
.27975
.24105
.20734
.17808
.15275
.13087
.11202
.09581
.08189
.06994
.05971
.05096
.04347
.03707
.03160
.02694
.02295
.01956
.01666
.01419
.01209
.01029
.00877
.00747
.00636
.00541
.00461
THE POPULATION -----
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
DAY SUSCEPTIBLES IMMUNES SUSCEPT
46.84505
46.84270
46.84070
46.83900
46.83755
46.83632
46.83527
46.83438
46.83362
46.83297
46 . 83242
46 . 83195
46.83155
46.83121
46.83092
46.83068
46.83047
46.83029
46.83014
46.83001
46.82990
46.82980
46.82972
46.82966
46.82960
46.82955
46.82951
46.82947
46.82944
46 . 82942
46.82939
46.82938
46.82936
46.82935
46.82933
46.82932
46.82932
46. 82931
46.82930
46.82930
46.82929
46.82929
INFECTIVES
.00668
.00569
.00484
.00412
.00351
.00299
.00254
.00216
.00184
.00157
.00134
.00114
.00097
.00082
.00070
.00060
.00051
.00043
.00037
.00031
.00027
.00023
.00019
.00016
.00014
.00012
.00010
.00009
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
INFECT IMMUNES
53.14827
53.15161
53.15446
53.15688
53.15894
53.16069
53.16219
53.16346
53.16454
53.16546
53.16624
53.16691
53.16748
53.16796
53.16838
53.16873
53.16902
53.16928
53.16950
53.16968
53.16984
53.16997
53.17008
53.17018
53.17026
53.17033
53.17039
53.17044
53.17048
53.17052
53.17055
53.17058
53.17060
53.17062
53.17064
53.17065
53.17066
53.17067
53.17068
53.17069
53.17070
53.17070
121
.00276
.00235
.00200
.00170
.00145
.00123
.00105
.00089 ~.
.00076
.00065
.00055
.00047
.00040
.00034
.00029
.00025
.00021
.00018
.00015
.00013
.00011
.00009
.00008 ~
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00000.
.00000
00117
00099
00085
00072
00061
00052
00044
00038
00032
00027
00023
00020
00017
00014
00012
00010
00009
00008
00006
00005
00005
00004
00003
00003
00002
00002
00002
00002
00001
00001
00001
00001
00001
00001
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
------ CHANGE IN ---------
.00392
.00334
.00284
.00242
.00206
.00175
.00149
.00127
.00108
.00092
.00078
.00067
.00057
.00048
.00041
.00035
.00030
.00025
.00022
.00018
.00016
.00013
.00011
.00010
.00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
The course of the epidemic with S = .8, y = .5, R0 = 15%,
and I, = .00001%
DAY
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
THE POPULATION-------- PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
84.99999
84.99998
84.99998
84.99997
84.99995
84.99994
84.99993
84.99991
84.99989
84.99986
84.99983
84.99979
84.99975
84.99970
84.99964
84.99958
84.99949
84.99940
84.99928
84.99915
84.99899
84.99881
84.99859
84.99833
84.99802
84.99766
84.99723
84.99673
84.99614
84.99544
84.99461
84.99364
84.99249
84.99113
84.98953
84.98764
84.98541
84.98278
84.97968
84.9,7602
84.97170
84.96660
84.9.6059
84.95350
84.94514
INFECTIVES
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00009
.00010
.00012
.00014
.00017
.00020
.00023
.00027
.00032
.00038
.00045
.00053
.00063
.00074
.00087
.00103
.00121
.00143
.00169
.00200
.00235
.00278
.00328
.00387
.00456
.00539
.00635
.00750
.00884
.01043
.01231
.01452
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES
15.00000
15.00000
15.00001
15.00002
15.00003
15.00004
15.00005
15.00006
15.00008
15.00010
15.00012
15.00014
15.00017
15.00021
15.00025
15.00030
15.00036
15.00044
15.00052
15.00062
15.00073
15.00087
15.00103
15.00122
15.00145
15.00171
15.00203
15.00240
15.00283
15.00335
15.00395
15.00467
15.00552
15.00651
15.00769
15.00908
15.01072
15.01265
15.01494
15.01763
15.02081
15.02455
15.02898
15.03419
15.04035
SUSCEPT
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00011
.00013
.00016
.00019
.00022
.00026
.00031
.00036
.00043
.00050
.00059
.00070
.00083
.00097
.00115
.00136
.00160
.00189
.00223
.00263
.00310
.00366
.00432
.00510
.00601
.00709
.00836
INFECT
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00011
.00013
.00016
.00019
.00022
.00026
.00030
.00036
.00042
.00050
.00059
.00070
.00082
.00097
.00114
.00135
.00159
.00187
.00221
122
IMMUNES
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00012
.00014
.00016
.00019
.00023
.00027
.00031
.00037
.00044
.00051
.00061
.00072
.00085
.00100
.00118
.00139
.00164
.00193
.00228
.00269
.00318
.00375
.00442
.00522
.00615
DAY
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
THE POPULATION-------- PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
84.93527
84.92363
84.90991
84.8,9373
84. 87465
84.85216
84.82565
84.79440
84.75759
84.71424
84.66319
84.60311
84.53242
84.44930
84.35163
84.23694
84.10238
83.94468
83.76007
83.54427
83.29241
82.99903
82.65807
82.26281
81.80602
81.27993
80. 67651
79.98757
79.20520
78.32209
77.33213
76. 2.30 96
75.01666
73.69045
72.25723
70.72607
69.11038
67.42770
65.69916
63.94855
62. 2.00 97
60.48145
58.81346
57. 21767
55.71097
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
.01713
.02020
.02382
.02809
.03313
.03906
.04604
.05426
.06394
.07533
.08871
.10444
.12291
.14457
.16996
.19967
.23439
.27490
.32206
.37683
.44028
.51351
.59772
.69411
.80385
.92801
1.06743
1.22265
1.39370
1.57996
1.77994
1.99114
2.20987
2.43115
2.64879
2.85555
3.04347
3.20442
3.33074
3.41599
3.45557
3.44731
3.39164
3.29161
3.15251
15.04760
15.05617
15.06627
15.07818
15.09222
15.10879
15.12832
15.15133
15.17847
15.21044
15.24810
15.29245
15.34467
15.40613
15.47841
15.56339
15.66323
15.78042
15.91787
16.07890
16.26732
16.48746
16.74421
17.04307
17.39013
17.79206
18.25606
18.78978
19.40110
20.09795
20.88793
21.77790
22.7,7347
23.87840
25.09398
26.41837
27.84615
29.36789
30.97010
32.63547
34.34346
36.07125
37.79490
39.49072
41.13652
INFECT IMMUNES
.00987
.01164
.01372
.01618
.01908
.02249
.02651
.03124
.03681
.04336
.0-5105
.06008
.07069
.08312
.09767
.11469
.13456
.15770
.18461
.21580
.25186
.29337
.34097
.39525
.45680
.52608
.60343
.68893
.78237
.88311
.98996
1.10117
1.21429
1.32621
1 . 43322
1.53116
1.61570
1.68268
1.72853
1.7,5062
1.74758
1.71952
1.66798
1.59579
1.50671
.00261
.00307
.00362
.00427
.00503
.00593
.00698
.00822
.00968
.01139
.01339
.01573
.01847
.02166
.02539
.02971
.03472
.04051
.04716
.05478
.06344
.07324
.08421
.09639
.10974
.12415
.13942
.15522
.17105
.18626
.19999
.21120
.21872
.22128
.21765
.20676
.18792
.16095
.12632
.08524
.03959
.00827
.05567
.10003
.13910
123
.00726
.00856
.01010
.01191
.01405
.01656
.01953
.02302
.02713
.03197
.03766
.04436
.05222
.06145
.07229
.08498
.09983
.11720
.13745
.16103
.18842
.22014
.25676
.29886
.34706
.40193
.46400
.53372
.61132
.69685
.78998
.88997
.99557
1.10493
1.21557
1.32440
1.42778
1.52174
1.60221
1.66537
1.70799
1.72779
1.72365
1.69582
1.64581
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION----- ------ CHANGE IN---------
DAY
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
SUSCEPTIBLES
54.30593
53 . 01072
51.82927
50. 76185
49.80565
48.95557
48.20485
47.54575
46.97000
46. 46926
46.03541
45. 66074
45.33806
45.0,6082
44.82311
44.61965
44.44575
44.29730
44.17072
44.06288
43.97108
43.8t9299
43.82658
43.7'7015
43.72221
43.68150
43.64693
43. 61759
43 . 5,9 270
43. 57157
43. 5,5366
43.53846
43.52556
43.51463
43.50536
43 . 4,97 50
43. 49083
43.4.8518
43.4,8039
43.47633
43.47289
43.46997
43.46749
43.46540
43.46362
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
2.98129
2.78586
2.57437
2.35461
2.13350
1.91683
1.70913
1.51368
1.33259
1.16703
1.01736
.88336
.76436
.65941
.56742
.48718
.41749
.35719
.30517
.26043
.22201
.18910
.16095
.13691
.11640
.09891
.08402
.07135
.06057
.05141
.04362
.03701
.03140
.02663
.02259
.01915
.01624
.01377
.01168
.00990
.00839
.00712
.00603
.00511
.00434
42.71278
44.20342
45.5,9635
46.88354
48.06085
49.12760
50.08601
50.94058
51.69742
52.36371
52.94722
53.45590
53.89758
54.27976
54.60947
54.89318
55. 13677
55.34551
55.52410
55.67669
55.810690
55.91791
56.01246
56.09294
56. 16140
56.21959
56.26905
56. 31106
56.34673
56.37702
56.40272
56.42453
56.44304
56.45874
56.47205
56.48335
56.49292
56.50104
56.50793
56. 51377
56.51872
56.52292
56.52647
56.52949
56.53205
INFECT IMMUNES
1.40504
1.2,9521
1.18144
1.0,6742
.95619
.85008
075072
.65911
.57575
.50073
043385
. 37468
.32268
.27724
.2,3771
.20347
.17390
.14844
.12658
.10784
.09180
.07810
.06640
.05643
.04794
.04071
.03456
.02934
.02490
.02112
. 01792
.01520
.01289
.01093
.00927
.00786
.00667
.00565
.00479
.00406
.00344
.00292
.00247
.00210
.00178
.17122
.19543
.21149
.21976
.22111
.21667
.20770
.19546
~.18109
.16556
.14967
.13400
.11900
.10494
.09200
.08024
.06969
.06030
.05201
.04475
.03841
.03291
.02815
.02404
O 02051
.0.1749
.01489
.01267
.01078
.0,0916
~ 00778
.00661
.00561
.00477
.00404
. 00343
.00291
.00247
.00210
.00178
.00151
.00128
.00108
.00092
.00078
124
1.57626
1.49065
1.39293
1. 28719
1.17731
1.06675
.95842
.85457
.75684
.66629
.58351
.50868
.44168
.38218
.32971
.28371
.24359
.20874
.17859
.15259
.13021
.11101
.09455
.08048
.06846
.05820
.04946
.04201
.03567
.03028
.02570
.02181
.01851
.01570
.01332
.01129
.00958
.00812
.00689
.00584
.00495
.00420
.00356
.00302
.00256
DAY
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
THE POPULATION-------- PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
43.46211
43.4,6083
43.45975
43.4,5883
43.4,5805
43.45739
43.4,5683
43.45636
43.45596
43.45562
43.45533
43 .4 5508
43 . 4;5488
43. 4.5470
43.4,5455
43.4,5442
43.45432
43.45423
43.45415
43.45408
43.4:5403
43.45398
43.45394
43.45391
43. 45388
43.45386
43.45384
43.45382
43.45380
43 . 4:5379
43.45378
43. 4,5 3 77
43.45376
43.45376
43.4,5375
4'3 .45375
43.4,5374
INFECTIVES
.00368
.00312
.00264
.00224
.00190
.00161
.00136
.00116
.00098
.00083
.00070
.00060
.00051
.00043
.00036
.00031
.00026
.00022
.00019
.00016
.00013
.00011
.00010
. 00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
------ nIANGE IN---------
IMMU5ES
56.53422
56.53605
56.53761
56.53893
56.54005
56.54100
56.54180
56.54249
56.5:4306
56.54355
56.5.4397
56.5,4432
56. 54462
56.54487
56.54509
56.54527
56.54542
56.54555
56.54566
56.54576
56.54584
56.54590
56.54596
56.54601
56.54605
56.54608
56.54611
56.54614
56.54616
56.54618
56.54619
56. 54621
56.54622
56.54623
56.54623
56.54624
56. 54625
SUSCEPT
.00151
.00128
.00108
.00092
.00078
.00066
00,0056
.0,0047
.00040
.00034
.00029
.00024
.00021
.00018
.00015
.00013
.00011
.0(0009
.00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
O.0002
.00002
.0.0002
. 00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.0:0001
.00001
O 0.0001
.00000
.00000
INFECT
0.0066
.0!0056
.000047
~ 0,0040
~.00034
.0,0029
.0:0025
.0,0021
.00018
.0,0015
.00013
.00011
.00009
~ 0,0008
000007
.00006
.00005
0.0004
.00003
.00003
~.00002
000002
000002
00,0001
.00001
00001
.00001
000001
.00001
.00001
.000000
000000
.000000
.00000
0 010000
.00000
.000000
125
IMMUNES
.00217
.00184
.00156
.00132
.00112
.00095
.00080
.00068
.00058
.00049
.00042
.00035
.00030
.00025
.00021
.00018
.00015
.00013
.00011
.00009
.00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.010001
.00001
.00001
.00001
The course of the epidemic with = .87, y
and I,= .00001%
DAY
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
THE POPULATION-------- PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
79.99999
79.99998
79.99997
79.99996
79.99995
79.99994
79.99992
79.9.9990
79.99988
79.99985
79.99981
79.99977
79.99972
79.99966
79.99959
79.99951
79.99940
79.99928
79.99914
79.99896
79. 99875
79.99850
79.99820
79.99785
79.99742
79.99691
79.99630
79.99557
79.99469
79.99365
79.99240
79.99091
79.98912
79.98698
79.98443
79. 98137
79.97772
79.97335
79.96812
79.96188
79.95441
79.94547
79.93480
79.92204
79.90678
INFECTIVES
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00009
.00010
.00012
.00015
.00018
.00021
.00025
.00030
.00036
.00043
.00051
.00061
.00073
.00088
.00105
.00126
.00150
.00180
.00215
.00257
.00307
.00367
.00439
.00525
.00628
.00751
.00898
.01074
.01284
.01535
.01835
.02194
.02622
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES
20.00000
20.00000
20.00001
20.00002
20.00003
20.00004
20.00005
20.00006
20.00008
20.00010
20.00013
20.00016
20.00019
20.00024
20.00029
20.00035
20.00042
20.00051
20.00061
20.00074
20.00089
20.00107
20.00128
20.00154
20.00185
20. 00221
20.00265
20.00318
20.00380
20.00455
20.00545
20.00653
20.00781
20.00934
20.01118
20.01338
20.01600
20.01914
20.02290
20.02739
20.03276
20.03918
20.04685
20.05603
20.06699
SUSCEPT
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00009
.00010
.00012
~.00015
.00017
.00021
.00025
.00030
.00036
.00043
.00051
.00061
.00073
.00087
.00104
.00125
. 00149
.00179
.00214
O.00256
.00306
.00365
.00437
.00523
.00625
.00747
.00893
.01068
.01276
.01525
INFECT
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00008
.00010
.00012
.00014
.00017
.00021
.00025
.00029
.00035
.00042
.00050
.00060
.00072
.00086
.00103
.00123
.00147
.00176
.00210
.00251
.00300
.00359
.00428
126
IMMUNES
.00000
.00000
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00002
.00002
.00003
.00003
.00004
.00004
.00005
.00006
.00007
.00009
.00010
.00013
.00015
.00018
.00021
.00026
.00031
.00037
.00044
.00052
.00063
.00075
.00090
.00107
.00128
.00154
.00184
.00220
.00263
.00314
.00375
.00449
.00537
.00642
.00767
.00918
.01097
= .5, Ro = 20%,
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
DAY
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
SUSCEPTIBLES
79.88855
79. 86677
79.84075
79.80966
79.77254
79.72823
79.67535
79.61227
79.53707
79.44746
79.34077
79.21386
79.06304
78.88403
78.67188
78.42088
78.12454
77.77550
77.36559
76.88582
76.32649
75.67745
74.92836
74.06921
73.09092
71.98615
70.75023
69.38212
67.88548
66.26938
64.54881
62.74464
60.88290
58.99353
57.10845
55.25944
53.47594
51.78322
50.20106
48.74313
47.41709
46.22507
45.16467
44.22996
43.41260
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
.03134
.03745
.04475
.05346
.06385
.07624
.09100
.10858
.12949
.15435
.18386
.21885
.26024
.30913
.36672
.43436
.51352
.60579
.71281
.83618
.97742
1.13775
1.31796
1.51813
1.73735
1.97345
2.22265
2.47943
2.73636
2.98428
3.21271
3.41053
3.56700
3.67287
3.72151
3.70977
3.63838
3.51191
3.33812
3.12698
2.88954
2.63679
2.37880
2.12411
1.87941
20.08011
20.09578
20.11450
20.13688
20.16361
20.19553
20.23365
20.27915
20.33344
20.39819
20.47536
20.56729
20.67672
20.80684
20.96140
21.14476
21.36194
21.61870
21.92160
22.27800
22.69609
23.18480
23.75368
24.41266
25.17172
26.04040
27.02712
28.13845
29.37816
30.74634
32.23848
33.84483
35.55010
37.33360
39.17003
41.03079
42.88568
44.70487
46.46082
48.12988
49.69338
51.13814
52.45654
53.64593
54.70799
INFECT IMMUNES
.01823
.02178
.02602
.03108
.03712
.04431
.05288
.06308
.07520
.08961
.10669
.12691
.15082
.17901
.21215
.25100
.29634
.34903
.40991
.47978
.55933
.64904
.74909
.85915
.97829
1.10477
1.23593
1.36810
1 . 49664
1.61610
1.72057
1.80418
1 . 86173
1.88937
1.88508
1.84901
1 .78350
1 .69272
1.58217
1.45792
1.32605
1.19202
1.06040
.93471
.81736
.00512
.00611
.00730
.00871
.01039
.01239
.01476
.01758
.02092
.02486
.02951
.03498
.04140
.04889
.05759
.06764
.07917
.09227
.10701
.12337
.14124
.16034
.18021
.20017
.21922
.23609
.24921
.25678
.25693
.24792
.22843
.19782
.15647
.10587
.04864
.01175
.07139
.12647
.17379
~.21114
.23745
.25275
.25799
.25469
.24470
127
.01311
.01567
.01873
.02238
.02673
.03192
.03812
.04550
.05429
.06475
.07718
.09193
.10942
.13012
.15456
.18336
.21718
.25676
.30290
.35640
.41809
.48871
.56888
.65898
.75907
.86868
.98672
1.11133
1.23971
1.36818
1.49214
1.60635
1.70526
1.78350
1.83644
1.86076
1.85488
1.81919
1.75596
1.66906
1.56349
1.44477
1.31839
1.18940
1.06205
------ CHANGE IN ---------
--- PERCENT OF THE POPULATION-----
DAY
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
SUSCEPTIBLES
42.70277
42.08994
41.56352
41.11324
40.72949
40.40342
40.12707
39.89337
39.69609
39.52981
39.38982
39.27211
39.17321
39.09018
39.0,2052
38.9,6209
38.91313
38.87209
38.83772
38.80894
38.78484
38.76467
38.74778
38.73365
38.72182
38.71193
38.70365
38.69672
38.69093
38.68608
38.68203
38.67864
38.6,7580
38.6,7343
38.6,7144
38.66978
38.6,6839
38.66723
38.66626
38.66545
38.66477
38.66420
38.66373
38. 6,6333
38.66300
IMMUNES SUSCEPTINFECTIVES
1.64954
1.43760
1.24522
1.07289
.92020
.78617
.66943
.56842
.48149
.40703
.34350
.28946
.24363
.20485
.17209
.14446
.12120
.10163
.08519
.07138
.05979
.05007
.04192
.03509
.02937
.0,2458
.02057
.01721
.0,1440
.01205
.01008
.00843
.00705
.00590
.00493
.00413
.00345
.00289
.00241
.00202
.00169
.00141
.00118
.00099
.00083
55.64769
56.47246
57.19126
57.81387
58.35031
58.81041
59.20350
59.53821
59.82242
60.06316
60.26668
60.43843
60.58316
60.70497
60.80740
60.89344
60.96567
61.02627
61.07709
61.11968
61.15537
61.18527
61.21030
61. 23126
61 .24881
61.26349
61.27578
61. 28607
61.29467
61.30187
61.30789
61.31293
61.31715
61.32067
61.3.2362
61.32609
61.32815
61.32988
61.33132
61.33253
61. 33354
61.3,3438
61.33509
61.33568
61.33618
INFECT IMMUNES
.70983
.61283
.52642
.45028
.38376
.32607
.27635
.23370
.19728
.16629
.13998
.11771
.09890
.08303
.06967
.05842
.04897
.04103
.03437
.02878
.02410
.02017
.01689
.01413
.01183
.00989
.00828
.00693
.00579
.00485
.00405
.00339
.00284
.00237
.00198
.00166
.00139
.00116
000097
.00081
.00068
.00057
.00048
.00040
.00033
.22987
.21194
.19238
.17234
.15269
.13403
.11674
.10101
.08693
.07446
.06353
.05403
.04583
.03878
.03276
.02762
.02326
.01957
.01645
.01381
.01159
.00972
.00815
.00683
.00572
~ 00479
.00401
~.00336
.00281
.00235
.00197
.00165
.00138
.00115
.00096
.00081
~.00068
.00056
.00047
.00040
.00033
.00028
.00023
.00019
.00016
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.93971
.82477
.71880
.62261
.53644
.46010
.39308
.33471
.28421
.2,4074
.20352
.17175
.14473
.12182
.10242
.08604
.07223
.06060
.05082
.04259
.03569
.02989
.02503
.02096
.01755
.01469
.01229
.01028
.00860
.00720
.0,0602
.00504
.00422
.00353
.00295
.00247
.00206
.00173
.00144
.00121
.00101
.00084
.00071
.00059
.00049
------ alANGE IN ---------
DAY
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
THE POPULATION-------- PERCENT OF
SUSCEPTIBLES
38.66272
38.66249
38.66229
38. 66213
38.66199
38.66188
38.66178
38.66170
38. 66164
38.66158
38.66154
38.66150
38.66146
38.66144
38.66141
38.66140
38.66138
38.6-6137
38. 66135
38. 66135
38.6.6134
38.6,6133
38.6,6133
38.6,6132
38.6,6132
INFECTIVES
.00069
.00058
.00048
.00040
. 00034
.00028
. 00024
.00020
.00017
. 00014
.00012
.00010
.00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
------ CHANGE IN---------
IMMUNES
61.33659
61. 3,3694
61.33722
61.33747
61.33767
61.33784
61.33798
61.33810
61.33820
61.33828
61.33835
61.33841
61.33845
61.33850
61.33853
61.33856
61.33858
61.33860
61.33862
61.33863
61.33864
61.33865
61.33866
61.33867
61.33867
SUSCEPT
.00028
.00023
.00019
.00016
.00014
.00011
.00010
.00008
000007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.000000
0 00000
INFECT
.00014
. 00011
.00009
.00008
.00007
.00006
. 0,0005
.00004
.00003
O.0003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.010001
.010001
.00001
.00001
.010001
.00001
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.00000
. 00000
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IMMUNES
.00041
.00035
.00029
.00024
.00020
.00017
.00014
.00012
.00010
.00008
.00007
.00006
.00005
.00004
.00003
.00003
.00002
.00002
.00002
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
.00001
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